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In Defense of Immutability 
Nicholas Serafin* 
Over the last forty years, the concept of immutability has been central 
to Equal Protection doctrine. According to current doctrine, a trait is 
immutable if it is beyond the power of an individual to change or if it 
is fundamental to personal identity. A trait that meets either of these 
criteria receives heightened legal protection under constitutional 
antidiscrimination law. Yet most legal scholars who have addressed the 
topic have called for the abandonment of the immutability criterion on the 
grounds that the immutability criterion is conceptually confused, morally 
indefensible, and bound to stigmatize subordinate groups. 
A rejection of the immutability criterion is unwarranted. The 
immutability criterion must be understood as targeting social, as opposed 
to personal, identities. In this Article, I introduce work from social 
psychology and sociology to unpack the concept of social identity. I show 
that stigmatized individuals are denied access to high-status groups, 
institutions, relationships, and occupations because of their immutable 
social identities. I conclude that, for Equal Protection doctrine, it 
is entirely irrelevant whether “immutable” traits are physically 
unchangeable or are part of an individual’s personal identity. 
After defending this “social” conception of immutability, I show that 
social immutability ties together a number of threads running throughout 
antidiscrimination law, namely, animus and stigma jurisprudence under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the “badges of slavery” reading of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. I then demonstrate how the social conception of 
immutability extends antidiscrimination protection to signifiers 
associated with gender expression, culture, and ethnicity. 
*I could not have completed this project without the support of Elizabeth Anderson and 
Richard Primus. I would also like to thank Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Derrick Darby, 
Peter Railton, Gabriel Mendlow, Norman Daniels, Ira Lindsay, and audiences at the 2018 
meeting of the Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Society, at Boston University School of 
Law, and at Santa Clara University School of Law. I would also like to thank the editors 
of the BYU Law Review for their insightful feedback. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2020 
276 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 276 
I. THE IMMUTABILITY CRITERION ................................................................... 280 
A. Old Immutability ................................................................................... 280 
B. Against Old Immutability .................................................................... 283 
C. From Old Immutability to New Immutability .................................. 285 
II. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY .............................................................................. 289 
A. Identity and Impermeability ................................................................ 294 
B. Relational Equality and Equal Protection .......................................... 300 
C. The Social Immutability Criterion ....................................................... 304 
III. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT ..................................... 305 
A. Animus ................................................................................................... 306 
B. Stigma ..................................................................................................... 308 
C. The Badges of Slavery ........................................................................... 309 
D. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 311 
IV. APPLICATIONS......................................................................................... 311
A. Gender Identity and Expression .......................................................... 312 
B. Hair ......................................................................................................... 316 
C. Language ................................................................................................ 324 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 330 
INTRODUCTION 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy observes that 
homosexuality is “both a normal expression of human sexuality 
and immutable.”1 Because homosexuality is immutable, Kennedy 
argues that same-sex marriage is the only recourse for gay 
individuals who seek the “profound commitment” that marriage 
offers.2 Kennedy does not define immutability, nor does he explain 
why immutability is relevant to Equal Protection. Nevertheless, his 
statement places Obergefell squarely within a class of cases that, 
over the past fifty years, has dramatically expanded the scope of 
antidiscrimination law.3 If Obergefell is any indication, the concept 
of immutability continues to play a substantial role in the Court’s 
Equal Protection analysis. 
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
2. Id. at 2594. 
3. See infra Part I. 
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At the same time, immutability is a perennial target of scholarly 
criticism. The immutability criterion has been attacked as, among 
other things, conceptually confused, over-inclusive, under-
inclusive, irrelevant, and stigmatizing.4 As Kenji Yoshino argued 
decades ago, “academic commentary seems univocal in calling for 
[the immutability criterion’s] retirement.”5 More recent scholarship 
has largely borne out Yoshino’s observation.6 Indeed, since 
Obergefell, calls to abandon the immutability criterion have 
continued apace.7 
There are good reasons to resist such calls. First, it is hard 
to deny that wrongful discrimination most often targets individuals 
on the basis of individual traits that are deeply difficult to 
change. As an analytical tool for understanding and addressing 
wrongful discrimination, the immutability criterion thus is roughly 
on the right track. Moreover, it is doubtful that legal scholars have 
identified a suitable replacement for the immutability criterion; 
in fact, some proposals seem bound to raise even thornier 
problems.8 Yet abandoning the immutability criterion without 
a suitable replacement would dramatically weaken Equal 
Protection doctrine. 
The immutability criterion should not be rejected, but it must 
be revised. In this Article, I propose a new conception of 
immutability, which I call “social immutability.” As I discuss in 
Part I, legal scholars and jurists have traditionally conceived of 
immutability as referring to individual traits that are physically or 
4. See infra Sections I.B and I.C. 
5. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption 
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 518 (1998) (citations omitted);  
Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1497, 1511 (2008) (observing 
that “[s]cholars argued convincingly in the 1990s that courts should discard immutability as 
a requirement for heightened scrutiny, compiling instances where courts already had done 
so”) (citations omitted); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118–22 (2010) (arguing that “the legal notion of 
immutability is confused”). 
6. See Schmeiser, supra note 5. 
7. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015). 
8. Compare, e.g., id. (arguing that the immutability criterion ought to be rejected in 
favor of expanded Title VII remedies such as statutory disparate impact standards) with 
Richard Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection and 
Disparate Impact After Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR 295 (2015) (noting that statutory disparate-impact standards are likely to survive only 
“in partly truncated form, as compared to what they once were”). 
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psychologically unchangeable. By contrast, according to the social 
conception of immutability, courts should not attempt to identify 
traits that are immutable in either sense. Instead, courts should 
focus on the immutability of particular social signifiers. As I explain 
below, a social signifier is any observable property or relation 
commonly used to sort individuals into different social groups.9 
Traits associated with race or sex are social signifiers in this sense. 
But many other properties and relations may also signify group 
membership, including hairstyle, gender expression, language, and 
much else.10 On the social conception of immutability, a signifier 
satisfies the immutability criterion when it possesses a low social 
status that persists throughout various social and political domains, 
regardless of the underlying nature of the signifier in question.11 
In Part II, I unpack the social conception of immutability. The 
social conception of immutability comprises two components: a 
descriptive account of trait-based discrimination and a normative 
account of Equal Protection. In Section II.A, I introduce the 
empirical work that underlies the descriptive account of trait-based 
discrimination. This work indicates that in settings characterized 
by group inequality individuals will tend to be assigned to high- or 
low-status social groups on the basis of observable signifiers. 
9. Describing human traits in terms of their semiotic functions naturally calls to mind 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s analysis of language systems in terms of the “signifier” and the 
“signified” as well as Charles Sanders Peirce’s analysis of signs in terms of the “object,” and 
the “interpretant.” See, respectively, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL 
LINGUISTICS 65–67 (2011) and CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, VOLUME 2, 478 
(Peirce Edition Project ed., 1998). Though my account of human traits as signifiers loosely 
draws upon these bodies of work, the social conception of immutability does not presuppose 
any particular account of language, sign systems, or signification. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. While my view is novel, it is not entirely without precedent. See, e.g., Samuel 
Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 681 (2001) (arguing that 
because immutable characteristics are “socially constructed,” the immutability criterion 
ought to cover characteristics “experienced by individuals within [a] culture as immutable”). 
By contrast, my account is concerned with ascriptive social identities, not with first-personal, 
subjective experience. Moreover, I do not claim that all characteristics that fall under the 
immutability criterion are socially constructed. See infra Section II.A. Richard Ford offers an 
account of “socially immutable” characteristics. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL 
CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 102 (2005). However, my account differs significantly in that I offer an 
empirical account of the social processes that generate immutable characteristics and defend 
changes to Equal Protection that Ford opposes. See infra Section IV.B. Finally, Jack Balkin 
connects immutability to status and stable social meaning. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of 
Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997). His work, however, predates important doctrinal 
developments that my view explains and justifies. 
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Often these signifiers will be very difficult to change; however, this 
will not necessarily be true of all such signifiers. It is more apt to 
think of certain social signifiers as “fixed,” in the sense that—
regardless of their biological or psychological bases and regardless 
of how difficult they are to change—these signifiers possess a stable 
social meaning in a variety of social and political settings. When 
a social signifier possesses a stable social meaning, individuals 
who bear the signifier can be reliably identified as belonging to a 
high- or low-status group. Low-status individuals will then face 
discrimination on the basis of the low-status social signifiers that 
they bear. 
I then discuss, in Section II.B, the normative principles 
underlying the social conception of immutability. Drawing on 
recent developments in moral philosophy, I argue that relational 
egalitarianism provides a compelling normative basis for the 
immutability criterion. For relational egalitarians, justice requires 
that the state work to disestablish unjust group hierarchies. 
Relational egalitarianism thus shares much conceptual overlap 
with Equal Protection doctrine, which has long been construed as 
forbidding class and caste hierarchy.12 While relational egalitarians 
have not focused specifically on legal doctrine, relational 
egalitarian insights are directly relevant to the immutability debate. 
For example, relational egalitarian arguments suggest that, for the 
purposes of Equal Protection analysis, it is largely irrelevant 
whether immutable traits are biological or psychological in origin, 
or whether they are due strictly to accidents of birth or involve 
individual choice in some respect. Rather, on this view, a social 
signifier warrants protection under the immutability criterion 
when it is associated with low-status groups and is used to deny 
members of low-status groups access to material resources or high-
status institutions, relationships, and occupations. 
In the remainder of the Article, I consider the relationship 
between the social conception of immutability and legal doctrine. 
In Part III, I argue that social immutability is consonant with 
existing Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. In 
a number of areas—specifically, animus and stigma jurisprudence 
12. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 314 (2007) (citing the anti-caste arguments of the Joint House-Senate Committee  
on Reconstruction, whose members drafted the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra 
Section II.B. 
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under the Fourteenth Amendment and the “badges of slavery” 
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment—Equal Protection requires 
that courts extend special solicitude to easily identifiable, low-
status social groups. The social conception of immutability 
similarly directs courts to pay particular attention to the ways in 
which members of low-status groups are wrongfully singled out. 
One virtue of the social conception of immutability is that it 
provides a unified account of these seemingly disparate aspects of 
Constitutional antidiscrimination law. 
Finally, in Part IV, I show how the social conception of 
immutability resolves existing controversies within Equal 
Protection doctrine surrounding gender expression, hair, and 
language. By relying on the traditional understanding of 
immutability, courts have issued a series of conflicting and 
confused rulings in each of these areas. The social conception of 
immutability, by contrast, provides a coherent rationale for 
extending Fourteenth Amendment protection to individuals who 
face discrimination on the basis of these signifiers. Overall, I 
demonstrate in the latter half of this Article that the social 
conception of immutability is central to understanding the past and 
shaping the future of antidiscrimination law. 
I. THE IMMUTABILITY CRITERION
In this Part, I discuss the origins and development of the 
immutability criterion. The Court has never offered a complete 
definition of immutability, and scholars have offered a variety of 
reconstructive accounts. Additionally, the immutability criterion 
has evolved over time to incorporate multiple factors. It is therefore 
helpful to think of contemporary immutability as a synthesis of two 
distinct standards, which I shall refer to as “old” immutability and 
“new” immutability.13 
A. Old Immutability
The Court first sets forth the immutability criterion in Frontiero 
v. Richardson.14 In Frontiero, a married female Air Force officer
sought to obtain for her husband and for herself various
13. This framing follows Clarke, supra note 7, at 13–27. 
14. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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government benefits, which required the officer to claim her 
husband as a “dependent.”15 Under federal law, a married 
serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent without providing 
proof of her dependence, whereas a married servicewoman could 
only claim her husband as a dependent after proving that he in fact 
relied upon her for over half of his financial support. In defense of 
the law, the military argued that, because wives are much more 
often financially dependent upon their husbands, it would be 
administratively convenient to require only servicewomen to prove 
the dependence of their partners.16 
Holding that the law constituted unconstitutional 
discrimination against servicewomen, the Court explains: 
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular
sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility.”17
The Court here characterizes sex as immutable by virtue of its 
similarity to race. But this simply raises further questions: How 
does the Court understand race? And in which respects, in the 
Court’s view, is sex like race? 
Perhaps, in the Court’s view, race and sex are alike in that traits 
associated with race or sex are biologically heritable and 
unchangeable. Immutability, on this interpretation, would refer to 
biologically heritable and unchangeable traits. However, there are 
two problems with this reading. First, it is unclear at best that 
American courts historically have viewed race as biologically 
heritable. Certainly, the theory of hypodescent undergirding 
various state racial classifications—from Tennessee’s “one drop” 
rule to Virginia’s one-fourth rule—indicated that some legislators 
considered race to be in some sense biologically heritable.18 Yet 
throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth 
century, courts generally avoided endorsing a strictly biological 
15. Id. at 678. 
16. Id. at 688. 
17. Id. at 686 (citation omitted). 
18. See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the 
One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2006). 
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account of race.19 Instead, it was often left to local institutions and 
local actors to define and enforce racial categories.20 Courts 
“consistently held that juries . . . should have great discretion in 
finding the ‘facts’ of race,” which included an individual’s 
behavior, dress, and social associates.21 Thus, if we are to rely on 
the Court’s historical understanding of race, immutability does not 
necessarily refer to biologically heritable traits. 
Second, national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy are also 
among the class of immutable traits that trigger heightened 
scrutiny.22 National origin, alienage, and illegitimacy, however, 
are plainly not biologically heritable. Rather, these traits are matters 
of social and political fact. By contrast, the Court has refused to 
grant protected class status to other traits, such as certain forms of 
mental disability, that at least in some cases are biologically 
heritable.23 As Cass Sunstein has pointed out, it seems that 
biological heritability is neither necessary nor sufficient for meeting 
the immutability criterion.24 
Perhaps instead the Frontiero Court simply means that an 
immutable trait is a trait that is, for whatever reason, impossible to 
shed. This, at least, is how Justice Brennan casts immutability in 
later cases. In Bakke, for example, Brennan claims that an immutable 
trait is simply a trait that an individual is “powerless to escape or 
set aside.”25 Yet note that the Frontiero Court’s definition of 
immutability also includes explicitly normative criteria. According 
to the Frontiero Court, discrimination on the basis of an immutable 
trait violates the principle that “legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility.”26 Discrimination on the 
19. See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999). 
20. Id. at 1381. 
21. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 117–33 (1998). 
22. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (noting that “the presumption of 
statutory validity may also be undermined when a State has enacted legislation creating 
classes based upon certain other immutable human attributes,” including national origin, 
alienage, and illegitimacy) (citations omitted). 
23. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to
recognize the mentally disabled as a “quasi-suspect class”). 
24. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2443 (1994). 
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
26. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
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basis of race or sex is unfair, on this view, because such 
discrimination burdens individuals on the basis of traits that they 
did not choose to adopt. Of course, whether an individual should 
be held responsible for possessing a particular trait has no bearing 
upon whether the trait itself is impossible to change. The former 
question concerns moral or legal norms, whereas the latter concerns 
the nature of the trait itself. A coherent understanding of 
immutability therefore must make sense of both the empirical and 
the normative criteria that indicate for the Court whether a 
particular trait satisfies the immutability criterion. 
According to the old immutability criterion, then, a trait is 
immutable if it meets two conditions. First, the trait must be such 
that an individual is powerless to escape it or set it aside. Second, 
an individual must bear no moral responsibility for possessing the 
trait; the trait must be, in the language of Frontiero, an “accident of 
birth.”27 As the Frontiero Court notes, this second condition reflects 
a moral concern, namely, that individuals should not be burdened 
on the basis of traits that they did not choose and cannot change. 
B. Against Old Immutability
In the decades after Frontiero, legal scholars advanced a number 
of influential criticisms of old immutability. As these criticisms are 
by now fairly well known, I shall only briefly canvas their main 
points. It is important to survey these criticisms, however, because, 
as I discuss below, while courts responded by adopting a new 
conception of immutability, it is doubtful that the new conception 
of immutability is a sufficient corrective. 
According to Kenji Yoshino, old immutability is “both over- 
and underinclusive.”28 It is overinclusive because “it is impossible 
for society to operate without discriminating on the basis of some 
immutable characteristics.”29 For example, suppose that height or 
intelligence are immutable characteristics. If immutable traits 
deserve protection, then the immutability criterion requires that 
Courts submit to heightened scrutiny legislation that differentially 
affects individuals on the basis of height or intelligence. Yet this is 
an implausible conception of the Equal Protection principle. 
27. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
28. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 504. 
29. Id. 
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Whereas Equal Protection has traditionally been understood as 
forbidding “caste and class” legislation, individuals who differ in 
height or intelligence do not inhabit separate castes or classes. More 
broadly, expanding the scope of Equal Protection to all immutable 
traits—as the immutability criterion seemingly requires—risks 
opening the floodgates to new Equal Protection claims. 
In Frontiero, the Court acknowledges this point, suggesting that 
some immutable characteristics, such as intelligence or physical 
disability, do not receive protection because, unlike race or sex, 
intelligence and physical disability may be relevant to job 
performance or to one’s ability to contribute to society.30 As John 
Hart Ely pointed out, however, this suggests that immutability is 
not actually a factor in the Court’s Equal Protection analysis; rather, 
it is relevance to legislative purpose that is truly important for 
determining when legislation wrongfully burdens a particular class 
of individuals.31 The Frontiero Court’s answer to the 
overinclusiveness objection, in other words, effectively vitiates 
immutability as a component of Equal Protection analysis. 
According to the underinclusiveness objection, the 
immutability criterion rests on the assumption that “legislation is 
less problematic if it burdens groups that can assimilate into 
mainstream society by either converting or passing.”32 That is, the 
immutability criterion seemingly permits wrongful discrimination 
against individuals or groups, so long as these individuals or 
groups are able to hide or shed their distinctive traits. Gays, 
lesbians, and religious minorities, for example, might find it 
relatively easy to conceal their group identities. Yet permitting such 
discrimination would inflict a number of serious harms upon 
those targeted. 
Ultimately it is unclear why the wrongfulness of discrimination 
should turn on whether a particular trait is mutable or immutable. 
As Laurence Tribe has pointed out, “even if race or gender became 
readily mutable by biomedical means, I would suppose that laws 
burdening those who choose to remain Black or female would 
30. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
31. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980). 
32. Yoshino, supra note 5, at 504; see also Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics 
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability,” 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 509 (1994) 
(observing that “the characteristics that define anonymous and diffuse groups are often 
acutely mutable, especially when they can be hidden”). 
275 In Defense of Immutability 
285 
properly remain constitutionally suspect.”33 Here, again, 
immutability seems at best indirectly relevant to the wrongfulness 
of discriminatory legislation. 
Another line of attack takes aim at the moral principle 
underlying old immutability. Recall that, according to the Frontiero 
Court, the immutability criterion protects individuals who are 
blameless for possessing stigmatized, immutable traits.34 But what 
about individuals who consciously choose to take on stigmatized 
traits? As Jessica Clarke argues, the fairness principle in Frontiero 
suggests that such individuals are to some extent morally culpable 
for their own misfortune and so are not owed legal protection.35 
Individuals who are responsible for possessing certain stigmatized 
traits may choose “to dissemble about their status, conceal the trait, 
or avoid seeking needed assistance,” lest they be subjected to 
permissible discrimination.36 Yet this outcome seems likely only 
to further stigmatize members of subordinate groups. Overall, by 
focusing on the individual responsibility of victims of 
discrimination, the old immutability criterion “deflect[s] attention 
from questions about whether those in power have [legitimate] 
reasons for imposing moralizing judgments on citizens 
or employees.”37 
C. From Old Immutability to New Immutability
Partly in response to the criticisms of old immutability, in a 
number of post-Frontiero cases courts revised the immutability 
criterion. The new immutability criterion focuses less on accidents 
of birth, emphasizing instead the relationship between immutable 
traits, personal identity, and individual liberty. New immutability 
first gained judicial recognition in Watkins v. U.S. Army.38 At issue 
in Watkins were new army regulations requiring the dismissal of all 
homosexual personnel. The case was brought by former U.S. Army 
Sergeant Perry J. Watkins, who had marked “yes” on a pre-
33. Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 n.52 (1980). 
34. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
35. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 17.
36. Clarke, supra note 7, at 21. Kenji Yoshino refers to this general problem as the 
“assimilationist bias” of the immutability criterion. Yoshino, supra note 5, at 490. 
37. Id. at 20. 
38. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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enrollment medical form in response to a question regarding 
whether he had “homosexual tendencies.”39 Acting pursuant to the 
new regulations, the army discharged Sergeant Watkins and 
refused his reenlistment. 
Watkins challenged the discharge and reenlistment regulations 
as a violation of Equal Protection. According to Watkins, the 
regulations invidiously discriminated against individuals on the 
basis of sexual orientation.40 Moreover, he argued, because 
homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Army 
regulations had to be submitted to strict scrutiny.41 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, finding for Watkins, declined to address 
these claims, holding instead that the Army was equitably estopped 
from refusing Watkins’ reenlistment.42 
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Norris takes up 
Watkins’ Equal Protection arguments. In order to determine 
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
Judge Norris canvasses previous accounts of immutability and 
concludes that “by ‘immutability’ the Court has never meant . . . 
that members of the class must be physically unable to change 
or mask the trait defining their class.”43 As Norris points out, 
non-white individuals may “pass” as white or even undergo 
pigment injections to effectively change their racial identity. Thus, 
while race is the paradigm case of immutability, at least some traits 
associated with race are, in fact, mutable. Similarly, Norris writes, 
“[i]t may be that some heterosexuals and homosexuals can change 
their sexual orientation through extensive therapy, neurosurgery or 
shock treatment.”44 Norris’s point is that if immutability is 
understood strictly, nothing is truly immutable, in which case the 
immutability criterion is worthless. 
However, Norris argues, the conception of immutability 
contained in prior case law can be read in “a more capacious 
manner” as having been based not on physical immutability, 
strictly speaking, but upon the personal effects of changing certain 
39. Id. at 701. 
40. Id. at 712. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 711. 
43. Id. at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
44. Id. 
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deeply held traits.45 According to Norris, “immutability” refers to 
“those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would 
be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to 
change them, regardless of how easy that change might be 
physically.”46 Norris concludes that under this definition sexual 
orientation is an immutable characteristic.47 
Some evidence suggests that the Supreme Court has adopted 
the new immutability criterion. For example, Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Obergefell begins with the claim that the Constitution 
grants certain rights “that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to 
define and express their identity.”48 For gay couples, Kennedy 
claims, “their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage” is 
the only way to exercise this liberty.49 Here Kennedy ties 
together liberty and privacy with the right to foster and maintain 
certain core features of one’s personal identity, which are themes 
familiar from Norris’s concurring opinion in Watkins. In light of 
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell, it seems plausible that new 
immutability will constitute an important part of Equal Protection 
doctrine going forward. 
Nevertheless, many legal scholars remain critical of the 
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection analysis. 
First, while new immutability shifts the focus from unalterable, 
physical traits to identity-related traits that are especially difficult 
to change, new immutability still takes into account whether an 
individual is responsible for possessing certain stigmatized traits. 
Thus, new immutability calls for “the same moralizing judgments 
as the old immutability.”50 
A good example of this problem can be seen in Varnum v. Brien, 
a pre-Obergefell gay marriage case.51 In Varnum, the Iowa Supreme 
Court notes that the new immutability criterion allows for a 
separation of “truly victimized individuals from those who 




48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
49. Id. at 2594. 
50. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 34 (citation omitted). 
51. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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identified with the [stigmatized] group.”52 As Clarke rightly 
points out, the Varnum holding requires “stigmatizing judgments 
about who is ‘truly’ victimized, based on whether a victim 
might have been able to change, hide, or downplay a 
disfavored characteristic.”53 According to the reasoning in Varnum, 
for example, a man who chooses to dress in traditionally 
feminine attire and who faces discrimination on this basis is 
not truly victimized, given that these aspects of his social 
presentation are matters of choice. But this is hardly a defensible 
result. Surely wrongful discrimination does not become 
permissible simply because its target has chosen to be identified 
with a stigmatized group. 
New immutability also fails to protect individuals whose 
stigmatized traits are inessential to their personal identity. For 
example, Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick, notes 
that “[h]omosexual orientation may well form part of the very 
fiber of an individual’s personality.”54 For Blackmun, this meant 
that the state could not punish homosexual individuals merely 
because of their status as homosexuals. Yet some individuals may 
be ambivalent or apathetic about the traits that supposedly form 
the fiber of their personality.55 Some homosexual individuals, 
for instance, might believe that their homosexuality is not essential 
to their personal identity. Either the contemporary immutability 
criterion does not protect these individuals, or the Court must 
hold that, despite their protestations to the contrary, these 
individuals are in fact defined by their traits. But this, too, is an 
implausible result. Homophobic legislation presumably violates 
Equal Protection regardless of the personal identities of its victims, 
and individuals should not be forced to accept the Court’s 
definition of their personal identity in order to receive protection 
from wrongful discrimination. 
Overall, new immutability fails as a replacement for old 
immutability. At the same time, however, it is difficult to ignore the 
tension to which I alluded in the Introduction, namely, that while 
52. Id. at 893. 
53. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 35 (citation omitted).
54. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202–03 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 41 (arguing that the immutability criterion fails to cover 
traits “that individuals would prefer to disclaim as constitutive of their authentic selves, and 
those traits that individuals would prefer to change due to shame or stigma”). 
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scholarly critiques of immutability continue to “fill volumes,”56 the 
Court’s actual uses of the immutability criterion have been, on the 
whole, broadly defensible. Employing the immutability criterion, 
the Court has expanded Equal Protection doctrine to include 
women, gays and lesbians, and individuals facing discrimination 
on the basis of national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy. Few 
critics of immutability take issue with this expansion of the 
doctrine; presumably critics of immutability would agree that 
affording heightened legal protection to these groups reflects a 
proper understanding of the moral principles underlying Equal 
Protection. For critics of immutability, then, while immutability is 
conceptually incoherent, the Court nevertheless managed to guide 
the doctrine in roughly the right direction. 
I draw a different lesson from the academic criticisms surveyed 
above. In my view, it is no accident that the Court was drawn to the 
concept of immutability. The Court was so drawn because the 
concept of immutability roughly captures an important truth about 
systemic discrimination, namely, that discrimination most often 
targets individuals on the basis of widely recognized traits that are, 
in some sense, difficult to change. Thus, what the academic 
criticisms surveyed above reveal is not that the immutability 
criterion should be abandoned but that the Court’s immutability 
analysis requires a better empirical account of trait-based 
discrimination and a more plausible normative justification for the 
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection. I take 
up these desiderata in the following Part. 
II. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY
In this Part I present a new conception of immutability, which I 
call “social immutability.” In Section II.A, I set forth the empirical 
work that underlies my account of trait-based discrimination. 
In Section II.B, I discuss the normative justification for the 
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection. And in 
Section II.C, I introduce the social immutability criterion. First, 
though, I must be clear about the concepts and terminology used 
throughout the rest of the Article. Equal Protection jurisprudence 
is replete with references to immutable “traits” and 
56. See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination 
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1418–19 (2014). 
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“characteristics,”57 terms often understood as referring to settled 
features of individuals that are in some sense biologically or 
psychologically fixed.58 However, I aim to defend a conception of 
immutability that is agnostic with regard to individual biology and 
psychology. To avoid the scientific connotations of “trait” and 
“characteristic” I shall therefore use the term “social signifier.” 
I define a social signifier as any observable property or relation 
in which the individual is involved and which is commonly used 
to sort individuals into groups. The function of a social signifier, as 
I am defining the concept, is to convey information about the 
various social groups to which an individual belongs. The groups 
to which an individual belongs comprise that individual’s 
social identity. 
Social signifiers may be visible characteristics of the body, such 
as skin color or hair texture. But social signifiers acquire their 
meaning as a matter of intersubjective recognition, and so a variety 
of properties and relations can come to be associated with different 
social groups. Social signifiers may comprise properties or relations 
such as speech patterns,59 names,60 addresses,61 and much else.62 
57. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (asserting that “sex, like 
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic”); see also City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (noting that “many immutable characteristics, such as height or blindness, are valid 
bases of governmental action and classifications under a variety of circumstances”); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (considering whether “undocumented status” is “an absolutely 
immutable characteristic”). 
58. Merriam-Webster, for example, includes the following definition: “Trait. (n.d.). 
1.a: a distinguishing quality (as of personal character) curiosity is one of her notable traits; b: 
an inherited characteristic.” Trait, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 
UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 2018). 
59. See Benjamin Munson & Molly Babel, Loose Lips and Silver Tongues, or, Projecting 
Sexual Orientation Through Speech, 1 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASS 416, 420 (2007) 
(reviewing studies on perceived differences between gay, lesbian, and straight patterns of 
speech, the authors note the “growing consensus in the fields of laboratory phonology, 
psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics that individuals invoke social expectations and social 
stereotypes when processing language”). 
60. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
991, 998 (2004) (demonstrating that fictitious job applicants given first names typically 
associated with Blacks receive fewer employer callbacks than fictitious job applicants given 
first names typically associated with whites). 
61. Id. at 1003. 
62. See infra Part IV. 
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Social signifiers convey information about the status of the 
social groups to which the individual belongs. Broadly speaking, 
the predominant social beliefs about various groups can be 
expected to take the following form: members of low-status social 
groups will be stereotyped as characteristically possessing vices, 
disabilities, dispositions to act in morally discreditable ways, or 
other social deficiencies.63 Members of high-status social groups 
will be stereotyped as characteristically possessing virtues, 
capabilities, dispositions to act in morally creditable ways, or other 
social competencies.64 Social signifiers associated with particular 
groups will then take on the moral valence of the stereotypical 
characteristics associated with that group.65 
With this understanding of social signifiers in mind, it is 
possible to distinguish broadly between two types of wrongful 
discrimination.66 The first type consists of bare hostility towards 
63. Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick & Jun Xu A model of (Often Mixed) 
Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and 
Competition, in SOCIAL COGNITION 78 (2018) (reviewing literature demonstrating that low 
status groups are typically viewed as “openly parasitic (i.e., opportunistic, freeloading, 
exploitative)” as well as “hostile and indolent”). 
64. See Peter A. Caprariello, Amy J.C. Cuddy, & Susan T. Fiske, Social Structure Shapes 
Cultural Stereotypes and Emotions: A Causal Test of the Stereotype Content Model,  
12 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 147 (2009) (providing an overview of studies 
demonstrating that members of high-status groups tend to be stereotyped as possessing 
above average competence). 
65. Note that the same characteristic can be differently valenced depending upon the 
social identity of the individual taken to bear the characteristic. White male executives who 
displayed anger were afforded higher status or salary relative to white male executives who 
did not, whereas Black male executives were more likely to be rewarded for displaying 
characteristics associated with warmth. See Robert Livingston & Nicholas Pearce, The Teddy-
Bear Effect: Does Having a Baby Face Benefit Black Chief Executive Officers?, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1229, 
1230 (2009). Likely this is because of the common stereotype associating Black facial features 
with aggression and perceived aggression in Black men with violence. See Kurt Hugenberg 
& Galen Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect 
in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 342, 345 (2004) (concluding that “[w]hen [racially 
ambiguous] faces were seen to display relatively hostile expressions (stereotypic of African 
Americans), individuals high in prejudice tended to categorize them as African American”); 
see also Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: 
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 590, 591 
(1976) (finding support for the hypothesis “that the threshold for labeling an act as violent is 
lower when viewing a [B]lack committing the same act”). 
66. To be clear, this is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the types of 
discrimination individuals or groups may face. My account of discrimination focuses solely 
on trait-based discrimination, as opposed to other forms, e.g., exclusion of minority groups 
from the political process. I thank Scott Hershovitz for encouraging me to clarify this point. 
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members of a particular group.67 The second type consists of 
differential treatment of individuals who bear low-status social 
signifiers. An employer, for example, might refuse to hire an 
individual who bears a low-status social signifier, on the grounds 
that the signifier reliably indicates (in the employer’s eyes) the 
possession of morally discreditable characteristics that fail 
meritocratic hiring criteria. 
The introduction of the term “social signifier” marks 
substantive differences between the social conception of 
immutability and current doctrine. First, current doctrine assumes 
that group boundaries simply fall out of natural differences in 
biologically or psychologically fixed traits. However, distinctions 
drawn between social groups often have no basis in the biological 
or psychological study of human traits and characteristics. Even in 
cases where a group boundary roughly tracks some empirically 
determinate difference, the social meaning of the boundary is often 
deeply conditioned by historical practices, material inequalities, 
cultural norms, folk knowledge, etc.68 
On my view, social signifiers possess a functional role in group 
dynamics: they are used by dominant groups to reinforce social 
boundaries. Importantly, social signifiers can perform this function 
regardless of whether they are physically or psychologically 
unchangeable. Indeed, the underlying nature of social signifiers is 
irrelevant here. To maintain the boundaries between high- and low-
status groups, it is simply necessary that either a sufficient number 
of individuals associate a particular signifier with a particular social 
group and believe that this signifier cannot be changed or that 
members of low-status groups are unwilling to shed the signifier, 
which is itself taken to be a morally discrediting fact about such 
individuals. Ultimately, as the social psychologist Henri Tajfel 
observes, “[t]he only ‘reality’ tests that matter with regard to group 
67. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (arguing that “if the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at  
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular  
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest”) (emphasis in original). I discuss  
the relationship between the social conception of immutability and animus doctrine  
in Section III.A. 
68. As Charles Tilly notes with regard to gender boundaries, for instance, “[t]hey 
correspond approximately to genetically based variations in physiology, yet they 
incorporate long historical accumulations of belief and practice.” CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE 
INEQUALITY 64 (1998). 
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characteristics are tests of social reality.”69 In other words, social 
signifiers and group boundaries will tend to be real to the extent 
that individuals understand them to be real and to the extent that 
individuals act on this understanding. 
The second important difference between my account and 
current doctrine is that on the current conception of immutability a 
stigmatized characteristic is protected if it is fundamental to 
personal identity. However, this conflates personal identity and 
social identity. As I noted above, an individual who bears some 
socially salient characteristic may judge that this characteristic is 
not a fundamental part of their personal identity.70 This is because 
personal identities are idiosyncratic and dependent upon an 
individual’s self-understanding.71 
By contrast, an individual’s social identity does not so depend 
upon the individual’s self-understanding. Social identities are 
ascriptive: if an individual is taken to meet the criteria for 
membership within a particular social group, they will be identified 
as a member of that group and will be treated according to the 
relevant set of social norms, regardless of whether the individual 
personally identifies as a member of this group.72 
Social identities are constructed on the basis of widely 
understood and relatively stable social judgments regarding the 
signifiers typically associated with various social groups. Of course, 
to say that these social judgments are widely understood is not to 
say that they are widely shared; the meaning and status of a 
signifier will likely be contested, particularly as subordinate groups 
69. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 258 (1981). 
70. See supra Section I.C. 
71. Peggy A. Thoits & Lauren K. Virshup, Me’s and We’s: Forms and Functions of Social 
Identities, in SELF AND IDENTITY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 106, 106–07 (Richard D. Ashmore & 
Lee Jussim eds., 1997). 
72. For a philosophical account of ascriptive social identities, see Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, The State and the Shaping of Identity, 23 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 241–
44 (2002). For classic sociological accounts of ascription in social relations, see RALPH LINTON, 
THE STUDY OF MAN 113–31 (1936); PARSONS TALCOTT, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 41–42 (Routledge 
2013) (1951); KINGSLEY DAVIS, HUMAN SOCIETY (1949); and Leon Mayhew, Ascription in 
Modern Societies, 38 SOC. INQUIRY 105 (1968). For work on the connections between ascription, 
status inequality, and identity formation, see Theodore D. Kemper, On the Nature and Purpose 
of Ascription, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 844 (1974), and Mary Jane Collier & Milt Thomas, Cultural 
Identity: An Interpretive Perspective, in THEORIES IN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 99 
(Young Yun Kim & William B. Gudykunst eds., 1988). 
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seek to overturn the negative connotations of the signifiers 
associated with their group.73 As I argue in Section II.B, social 
immutability targets caste hierarchies; thus, it is the social 
judgments of dominant groups that merit scrutiny. For now, the 
important point is that, for the social immutability criterion, it is 
unnecessary for courts to examine an individual’s personal 
identity. Instead, courts need only consider whether an individual 
faced discrimination for bearing a signifier that is constitutive of or 
associated with a low-status social identity. 
A. Identity and Impermeability
In this Section, I discuss some empirical research concerning the 
processes by which social identities are formed and group 
hierarchies are maintained. It is important to present such work for 
two reasons. First, having argued that immutability should not be 
understood as referring to biological or psychological traits of 
individuals, it is necessary to provide an account of what it is that 
the immutability criterion should protect. The empirical work 
introduced below is part of this account. Second, in 
antidiscrimination cases litigators, advocates, and other interested 
parties may frame their arguments around (their understanding of) 
the Court’s immutability analysis.74 An empirical account of 
signifiers and group hierarchy may thus help to inform the legal 
and political strategies of parties seeking to expand Equal 
Protection to new signifiers and to new social groups. 
I begin with social identity theory, a theoretical framework for 
explaining and predicting certain recurrent features of intergroup 
status conflict. Social identity theory posits three psychological 
73. See, e.g., Claud Anderson & Rue L. Cromwell, “Black Is Beautiful” and the Color 
Preferences of Afro-American Youth, 46 J. NEGRO EDUC. 76–77 (1977) (describing the “Black is 
Beautiful” slogan as an attempt to counter skin color discrimination by asserting a “positive 
self-concept and self-acceptance for people of African descent in America”); see also  
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 106 (2007) (describing 
the slogan “Gay is good” as performing a similar function for the gay rights movement). 
74. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Psych. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (citations omitted) (“A number of researchers have found 
familial patterns and biological correlates of adult homosexual orientation, suggesting that 
genetic, congenital, or anatomical factors may contribute to its development. . . . The 
scientific literature thus strongly indicates that sexual orientation is far from being a 
voluntary choice.”). Though the Brief does not explicitly mention the immutability criterion, 
such language is reminiscent of old immutability. 
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processes that drive group formation and intergroup conflict: 
categorization, comparison, and identification.75 Social 
categorization refers to the tendency of individuals to sort 
themselves and others into groups on the basis of meaningful 
criteria. Social categories are often constructed around visually 
salient features of the human body.76 As I discuss below, social 
categorization may take place regardless of whether these embodied 
features are physically unchangeable. 
The mere fact of categorization affects individual cognition and 
behavior with regard to members of other groups.77 Once a social 
category has been constructed and disseminated widely, 
individuals tend to rely on these categories and their associated 
signifiers, in some cases automatically, as cognitive shortcuts 
for processing social information.78 For instance, individuals tend 
to accentuate the perceived differences between groups or 
categories;79 ingroup members tend to view outgroups as more 
homogenous than the ingroup;80 and, ingroup members are 
75. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel 
eds., 1979). For meta-analytic reviews of the evidence supporting the key concepts of social 
identity theory, see Naomi Ellemers, The Influence of Socio-Structural Variables on Identity 
Management Strategies, 4 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 27 (1993).; see also B. Ann Bettencourt et al., 
Status Differences and In-Group Bias: A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Effects of Status Stability, 
Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 520 (2001). 
76. See Charles Stangor, Laure Lynch, Changming Duan & Beth Glas, Categorization of 
Individuals on the Basis of Multiple Social Features, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 207 (1992); 
C. Douglas McCann, Thomas M. Ostrom, Linda K. Tyner & Mark L. Mitchell, Person 
Perception in Heterogeneous Groups, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1449 (1985). 
77. See Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup 
Behaviour, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 27 (1973). 
78. See generally C. Neil Macrae & Galen Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Categorical 
Person Perception, 92 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 239 (2001). 
79. Olivier Corneille, Olivier Klein, Sophie Lambert & Charles M. Judd, On the Role of 
Familiarity with Units of Measurement in Categorical Accentuation: Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) 
Revisited and Replicated, 13 PSYCH. SCI. 380 (2002); Joachim Krueger & Myron Rothbart, 
Contrast and Accentuation Effects in Category Learning, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 651 
(1990); Henri Tajfel & Alan L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. 
PSYCH. 101 (1963). 
80. David De Cremer, Perceptions of Group Homogeneity as a Function of Social 
Comparison: The Mediating Role of Group Identity, 20 CURRENT PSYCH. 138 (2001); Jennifer G. 
Boldry, Lowell Gaertner & Jeff Quinn, Measuring the Measures: A Meta-Analytic Investigation 
of the Measures of Outgroup Homogeneity, 10 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 157 (2007). 
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more willing to engage in cooperative behavior with and to expect 
reciprocation from fellow ingroup members.81 
In a status hierarchy, individuals will also form beliefs about 
the moral character of members of outgroups. Members of high-
status groups, for example, will seek to attribute to members of 
low-status social groups stereotypical characteristics that possess a 
negative moral valence: vices, disabilities, dispositions to act in 
morally discreditable ways, or other social deficiencies.82 When a 
social signifier becomes associated with a low-status social group, 
the signifier will also take on the negative moral valence of the 
characteristics stereotypically attributed to this group. 
Social comparison is the process by which social signifiers acquire 
social meaning. As Tajfel argues, the status of social signifiers is a 
result of intergroup comparisons: social signifiers associated with a 
particular group “achieve most of their significance in relation to 
perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation 
of these differences.”83 In other words, social signifiers may have 
no biological basis and may have little or no significance outside of 
a particular social setting. Nevertheless, so long as individuals treat 
them as indicative of significant group differences, social signifiers 
will be no less real and no less meaningful for individuals than 
other aspects of their environment. 
Finally, social identification denotes “the extent to which people 
define themselves (and are viewed by others) as members of a 
certain social category.”84 Simply identifying as a member of a 
group is sufficient to prompt discriminatory treatment of 
outsiders.85 Individuals tend to overestimate the similarities 
between themselves and fellow members of their groups, and 
ingroup members tend to rate their own group higher on positive 
81. Toshio Yamagishi & Toko Kiyonari, The Group as the Container of Generalized 
Reciprocity, 63 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 116 (2000); Lowell Gaertner & Chester A. Insko, Intergroup 
Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm: Categorization, Reciprocation, or Fear?,  
79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 77 (2000); DONALD KINDER & CINDY KAM, US AGAINST 
THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN OPINION 21–24 (2009). 
82. See Fiske et al., supra note 63. 
83. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65, 71 (1974). 
84. See Ellemers, supra note 75, at 29. 
85. See generally Billig & Tajfel, supra note 77. 
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characteristics and lower on negative characteristics.86 By contrast, 
ingroup members tend to believe that outgroups are relatively 
homogenous, particularly with regard to characteristics 
stereotypically associated with the outgroup.87 Likely these 
phenomena are due, in part, to the fact that, beginning at a young 
age, individuals tend to conceive of social groups in terms of 
essences or “natural kinds,” particularly when members of an 
outgroup are perceived as sharing the same visual signifiers.88 
I note here one departure from social identity theory. According 
to social identity theory, as originally conceived, a social identity is 
a type of self-description. However, in what follows I shall focus 
specifically on ascriptive social identities. As the anthropologist 
Fredrik Barth observed in his classic study of ethnic group 
boundaries, ascriptive social identities result from a process of 
social labeling, whereby a social category is imposed upon a set of 
individuals who (it is believed) possess a common set of signifiers.89 
Crucially, it is not necessary that a particular individual endorse or 
identify with the social identity she has been ascribed; rather, so 
86. Jordan M. Robbins & Joachim I. Krueger, Social Projection to Ingroups and 
Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 32 (2005); Rupert 
Brown, Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges, 30 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 745, 747 (2000) (citing a variety of studies, the author notes that “it is by 
now a common-place that group members are prone to think that their own group (and its 
products) are superior to other groups (and theirs), and to be rather ready behaviourally to 
discriminate between them as well”). 
87. See, e.g., Mark Rubin & Constantina Badea, Why Do People Perceive Ingroup 
Homogeneity on Ingroup Traits and Outgroup Homogeneity on Outgroup Traits?, 33 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 31 (2007). 
88. See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP PERCEPTION: PERCEIVED VARIABILITY,
ENTITATIVITY, AND ESSENTIALISM 81 (Vincent Yzerbyt et al. eds., 2004) (reviewing literature 
demonstrating that “[w]hen one or several perceptual cues point to the entitativity of a group 
of people, perceivers are inclined to infer the presence of some essence shared by these 
people” and that ”[a]s a result, they may often end up making strong assumptions about the 
inductive potential and unalterability associated with group membership”); see also SUSAN 
A. GELMAN, THE ESSENTIAL CHILD: ORIGINS OF ESSENTIALISM IN EVERYDAY THOUGHT 89–98 
(2003) (discussing evidence demonstrating “that five-year-olds believe that not only race but 
also a range of biological[,] though not psychological[,] properties are fixed at birth and 
immutable over the life span” and that “[b]y late preschool, children reliably presume that 
innate propensities shape race, language, and gender, suggesting that children may hold 
nativist expectations about a broad range of phenomena”). 
89. ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE 
DIFFERENCE 10 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1998). 
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long as an ascriptive social identity is “intersubjectively widely 
recognized” it will continue to shape social reality.90 
Social categorization, social comparison, and social 
identification are processes that characterize the formation of group 
identities and their associated signifiers. To explain how these 
processes affect intergroup dynamics, I will introduce one last piece 
of terminology. Much work on intergroup conflict focuses on the 
relative permeability of group boundaries—that is, the extent to 
which individuals in a social system can move between groups.91 
In order to maintain their dominant social position, high-status 
groups will generally seek to maintain relatively impermeable 
group boundaries. This is because when most members of a low-
status group are barred from high-status groups or social positions 
it is far more difficult for lower status groups to improve their 
standing in the status hierarchy. Ascribing to others a low-status 
social identity—especially a low-status ethnic, racial, or gender 
identity—is a common method by which dominant groups 
maintain impermeable group boundaries. As Barth puts it, such 
identities are “superordinate to most other statuses, and define[] 
the permissible constellations of statuses, or social personalities” 
that low-status individuals may assume.92 
To be sure, group boundaries will be absolutely impermeable 
only in the most extreme caste hierarchies; in all other cases, there 
will be varying degrees of individual mobility. Yet it is important 
to note that permeability is not simply reducible to the number of 
low-status individuals who are able to join higher status groups, for 
even where individual mobility is possible, conditions of entry and 
exit are often tied to a particular group’s position in the status 
hierarchy. For instance, in hypergamous caste societies, women are 
expected to raise their status by “marrying up” into a higher class 
or caste but are generally forbidden from “marrying down.”93 In 
other cases, entry into higher status groups is conditioned upon 
hiding, downplaying, or shedding a signifier associated with a low-
90. RICHARD JENKINS, SOCIAL IDENTITY 154 (2004). 
91. See generally Naomi Ellemers, Ad van Knippenberg & Henk Wilke, The Influence of 
Permeability of Group Boundaries and Stability of Group Status on Strategies of Individual Mobility 
and Social Change, 29 BRIT J. PSYCH. 233, 236 (1990). 
92. ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES, supra note 89, at 17. 
93. Louis Dumont, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
116–18 (Mark Sainsbury et al. trans., 1980). 
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status identity.94 As these examples indicate, even when group 
boundaries are permeable in some respects, they may nevertheless 
serve to reinforce the subordinate position of low-status groups. 
Note also that group boundaries often will exhibit a certain 
symmetry with respect to high- and low-status individuals. 
Relatively impermeable group boundaries function most obviously 
to prevent low-status individuals from joining high-status groups. 
However, in many cases higher status individuals will be generally 
prevented from joining lower status groups as well. This is because, 
for a status hierarchy based on ascriptive social identities to 
operate, there must exist clearly demarcated signifiers that possess 
separate meanings and separate statuses. Clearly demarcated 
signifiers effectively identify who is to receive and who is to be 
denied access to material goods and to high-status occupations, 
roles, and relationships. When enough individuals adopt signifiers 
associated with statuses or ascriptive identities different from their 
own, the meaning or status of the signifier may become ambiguous 
and thus ineffective for distinguishing between members of high- 
and low-status groups. As I discuss below, it is for this reason that 
Equal Protection immutability doctrine affords protection to 
individuals from high-status groups who bear relatively lower 
status signifiers.95 
Overall, relatively impermeable group boundaries can be 
successfully maintained when low-status individuals are ascribed 
a social identity that possesses a uniformly low status across a 
variety of social and political contexts. In order to ensure this 
outcome, high-status groups can be expected to claim that certain 
traits associated with low-status groups are immutable, regardless 
of the underlying biological or psychological facts.96 Furthermore, 
high-status groups will seek to ensure that these purportedly 
immutable characteristics carry a negative moral valence. An 
individual who bears these characteristics will be taken to possess 
morally discreditable attributes and dispositions that can be 
94. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 490 (arguing that “courts [are] more likely to withhold 
heightened scrutiny from groups that can change or conceal their defining trait”). 
95. See infra Section IV.A. 
96. For an example of this phenomenon, see Ramaswami Mahalingam, Essentialism, 
Culture, and Power: Representations of Social Class, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES, 733, 742–45 (2003) 
(discussing evidence indicating that members of dominant social groups in India conceive 
of caste in essentialist terms, whereas members of low-status groups do not). 
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invoked as grounds for denying the individual equal access to 
high-status roles, occupations, and relationships. 
The critical point is that members of high-status groups do not 
need to possess an accurate understanding of human traits or 
personal identity in order to exclude members of low-status 
groups. To be sure, low-status social identities are often constructed 
on the basis of signifiers that are physically difficult to change, such 
as skin pigmentation and hair texture. By protecting signifiers that 
are difficult to change, the contemporary immutability criterion is 
thus broadly on target. But any signifier that is closely associated 
with members of low-status groups and that, in relation to low-
status individuals, possesses a negative moral valence, will suffice 
for maintaining relatively impermeable social boundaries. 
Any plausible conception of immutability must take this fact 
into account. 
B. Relational Equality and Equal Protection
In this Section, I turn to the normative basis of the immutability 
criterion. As I noted above, the Frontiero Court’s concern for 
individual responsibility fails to justify the immutability criterion: 
presumably Equal Protection would still forbid discrimination on 
the basis of race, even if an individual were to intentionally take on 
the visible characteristics associated with a different race.97 In other 
words, the normative principle introduced in Frontiero is effectively 
at odds with one of the central purposes of the Equal Protection 
clause, namely, eliminating racial discrimination in order to ensure 
equal citizenship for Blacks and other subordinated groups. 
A more plausible normative foundation for the immutability 
criterion can be found by considering the history of Equal 
Protection as a bulwark against the formation of caste hierarchies. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, antislavery activists and 
politicians regularly invoked the metaphor of caste to describe the 
unequal status of racial groups within the United States.98 These 
references to caste were not mere rhetorical flourishes but instead 
represented a fairly sophisticated understanding of the mechanics 
of group hierarchy and social group formation. 
97. See supra Section I.C. 
98. Scott Grinsell, “The Prejudice of Caste”: The Misreading of Justice Harlan and the 
Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L., 317, 339–53 (2009). 
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For example, in his public lecture, “The Question of Caste,” 
Charles Sumner observes that caste hierarchies entrench 
permanent inequalities of status.99 At the heart of a caste hierarchy, 
Sumner argues, there lies a division of social groups into those who 
receive “hereditary rank and privilege” and those who receive 
“hereditary degradation and disability.”100 According to Sumner, 
within the United States “the Caste claiming hereditary rank and 
privilege is white; the Caste doomed to hereditary degradation 
and disability is black or yellow, and it is gravely asserted that this 
difference of color marks difference of race, which in itself justifies 
the discrimination.”101 Though his language is reminiscent of the 
biological conception of immutability that I considered above and 
rejected, Sumner is identifying one of the key mechanisms by which 
group status hierarchies are sustained over time: namely, the 
association of subordinate groups with low-status social signifiers, 
which are taken as grounds for discriminatory treatment. Other 
discussions of caste, both before and after Sumner’s time, evince 
a similar sophistication with regard to social signifiers and 
caste hierarchy.102 
Sumner’s observations suggest that a plausible normative 
justification for the immutability criterion must directly address 
the relationship between the imposition of legal burdens and the 
processes that sustain status hierarchies. Recently, egalitarian 
moral philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel 
Scheffler have focused specifically on the nature of group status 
hierarchy, and their analyses are instructive for the immutability 
debate. For these “relational egalitarians,” equality comprises “a 
kind of social relation between persons” and egalitarian justice 
requires that all persons receive “an equality of authority, status, or 
standing” with regard to important social relationships.103 On this 
view, whether an individual or a group is regarded as an equal can 
only be determined by looking at how the individual or group fares 
across a wide range of social and political settings. This is so for two 
99. CHARLES SUMNER, THE QUESTION OF CASTE: LECTURE (1869). 
100. Id. at 10. 
101. Id. 
102. Grinsell, supra note 98, at 320. (characterizing 19th century discussions of caste as 
a “richly articulated set of arguments about the nature of status-based harm”). 
103. Elizabeth Anderson, The Fundamental Disagreement Between Luck Egalitarians and 
Relational Egalitarians, 40 CAN. J. PHIL. 1 (2010) (internal citation omitted). 
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reasons: first, what constitutes equal status will depend upon the 
social norms and shared meanings within particular contexts, and, 
second, an individual or group may receive equal treatment in one 
setting but yet may be subject to degradation and other status 
harms in other settings. 
To be sure, relational egalitarians do not ignore the importance 
of individual responsibility; relational egalitarians would agree 
with the Frontiero Court’s insight that, in general, legal burdens 
ought to bear some relationship to individual responsibility. 
However, for relational egalitarians, the primary aim of just 
political institutions is to ensure that individuals are regarded as 
full and equal members of society. This requires first and foremost 
the elimination of “social relationship[s] by which some people 
dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon 
others.”104 The elimination of these relationships is required, 
relational egalitarians argue, even when individuals bear some 
responsibility for their own misfortune.105 
Relational egalitarian arguments, though primarily 
philosophical, are directly relevant to the immutability debate. 
First, relational egalitarianism requires that individuals receive 
protection from wrongful discrimination regardless of whether 
they have chosen to adopt signifiers associated with low-status 
groups. Adapting the language of Frontiero, a relational egalitarian 
justification of the immutability criterion might run as follows: 
irrespective of individual responsibility, legal burdens ought not be 
such that they create or maintain socially immutable, low-status 
social identities. 
Relational egalitarianism also provides a coherent framework 
for other aspects of the immutability criterion. For example, 
because they view equality as a social relationship, relational 
egalitarians recognize that a group’s social position is not simply 
reducible to its share of political power or its control over material 
resources and economic opportunities. Whether a group is 
regarded as an equal depends upon whether the members of the 
group are allowed equal access to a variety of status-conferring 
social institutions, practices, occupations, and relationships. 
104. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 313 (1999).
105. For relational egalitarians, just criminal punishment, which may carry a stigma, is 
permissible, though even here there are limitations upon the extent to which a person may 
be stigmatized for breaking the law. 
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By comparison, consider Justice Scalia’s observation that gays 
constitute a “politically powerful” group with a “high disposable 
income,” and hence do not warrant the Court’s protection.106 While 
accurate in some respects,107 Scalia’s argument overlooks the fact 
that singling out a group for exclusion from a traditionally status-
conferring social institution—such as marriage—plainly signals 
that the group is of low standing. In fact, it is not uncommon for 
low-status groups to possess certain circumscribed advantages 
over high-status groups. For example, in late nineteenth-century 
Germany Jewish individuals claimed an above-average share of 
national income, and many individual Jews attained prominent 
positions in social and political life.108 Nevertheless, German Jews 
were excluded from Gentile dueling clubs, which were at the time 
important status signifiers.109 Dueling “allow[ed] for people to 
make claims to equality as individuals,” a claim that non-Jewish 
Germans refused to recognize.110 The point is that the relative status 
of a group can only be determined by looking closely at a range of 
status-conferring practices, norms, and institutions, which is just 
what the social immutability criterion requires. 
Finally, relational egalitarianism provides support for 
expressivist aspects of Equal Protection doctrine. Broadly speaking, 
expressivist accounts of law hold that, in addition to their 
regulative functions, laws also may express commonly understood, 
public meanings.111 The public meaning of a law may be inferable 
from the writings, statements, intentions, or other actions of 
legislators, but the public meaning of a law is not necessarily a 
product of these actions. As a communal form of expression, the 
106. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Christopher Carpenter & Samuel Eppink, Does It Get Better? Recent Estimates of 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings in the United States, 84 S. ECON. J. 426, 433–34 (2017) (finding 
both that “gay men earn significantly higher wages than comparable heterosexual men” and 
that “lesbians have significantly higher annual earnings than similarly situated heterosexual 
women, conditional on full-time work”). 
108. TILL VAN RAHDEN, JEWS AND OTHER GERMANS: CIVIL SOCIETY, RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY, AND URBAN POLITICS IN BRESLAU, 1860–1925, 63 (Marcus Brainard trans., Univ. of 
Wis. Press 2008). 
109. See generally Mika LaVaque-Manty, Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the 
Modern Politics of Dignity, 34 POL. THEORY 715 (2006). 
110. Id. at 716. 
111. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: 
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
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expressive content of a law can be ascertained only “in light of the 
community’s other practices, its history, and shared meanings.”112 
Social immutability is an expressivist view in two respects. 
First, social immutability is concerned with ascriptive social 
identities, which are constructed on the basis of widely understood 
and relatively uniform social judgments regarding social signifiers 
associated with particular groups. Relational egalitarian principles 
thus cannot be put into practice without a clear understanding of 
these social judgments. In order to eliminate hierarchies based on 
race or gender, for example, it is necessary to first understand 
which signifiers are publicly recognized as expressing a racial or 
gender identity. 
Second, it is to be expected that politically dominant groups will 
seek to formalize their status judgments through law.113 Relational 
egalitarianism thus requires courts to scrutinize legislation for 
impermissible expressive content; that is, content which 
“express[es] contempt, hostility, or inappropriate paternalism 
toward racial, ethnic, gender, and certain other groups, or that 
constitute[s] them as social inferiors or as a stigmatized or pariah 
class.”114 When the Court ignores or overlooks the status judgments 
expressed in law, dominant groups are able to use the authority of 
the state to maintain relatively impermeable boundaries between 
high- and low-status groups.115 
C. The Social Immutability Criterion
I now turn to the social immutability criterion itself. A social 
signifier satisfies the social immutability criterion when it meets 
two conditions: first, the signifier is constitutive of or closely 
associated with a low-status social identity; second, those who are 
taken to bear the signifier generally face relatively greater obstacles 
to joining high-status groups, taking on high-status social roles 
and occupations, or acquiring the means necessary for obtaining 
112. Id. at 1525. 
113. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B. 
114. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 111, at 1533. 
115. Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that if “the 
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” 
then “it is . . . solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it”)  
with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate facilities are  
“inherently unequal”). 
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higher status. Such obstacles include but are not limited to 
wrongful discrimination, stigmatization, stereotyping, and other 
forms of arbitrary bias. 
To be sure, one might wonder whether, by focusing on ascribed, 
low-status social identities as opposed to unchangeable human 
traits, I have offered a theory of immutability as that term is 
ordinarily understood. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that “immutability” is a legal term of art, and, as such, departures 
from ordinary usage may be warranted, particularly when such 
departures serve a useful legal function. As Judge Norris observes 
in Watkins, most human traits, including those associated with race 
and gender, are changeable to some extent.116 Nevertheless, racial 
and gender identities are longstanding means by which to sort 
individuals into groups of differing social status. Indeed, in some 
case, the social import of these identities, as well as of their 
associated signifiers, has endured over centuries.117 It is this critical 
fact about social hierarchy that the doctrine of immutability tracks. 
The mere fact that the legal doctrine of immutability fails to track 
the dictionary definition of “immutability” provides insufficient 
grounds for depriving Equal Protection of an important framework 
for understanding how ascribed identities reinforce unjust 
status hierarchy. 
In the next two Parts, I discuss some practical matters of 
application. In Part III, I consider the relationship between social 
immutability and existing antidiscrimination doctrine. To get a 
sense of how the social immutability criterion would operate in 
practice, I then demonstrate, in Part IV, that the social conception 
of immutability resolves some ongoing problems within 
antidiscrimination law. 
III. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
Social immutability ties together three longstanding doctrines 
within antidiscrimination law: (a) the Court’s hostility toward 
legislation that evinces animus towards identifiable social groups; 
(b) the Court’s hostility toward legislation that stigmatizes certain
social identities; and, (c) the Court’s endorsement of the authority
of Congress, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, to
116. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring). 
117. See infra Section IV.B. 
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abolish the “badges and incidents” of slavery. Each of these 
doctrines requires the Court to closely scrutinize legislation 
targeting low-status social identities and social signifiers. To be 
sure, each of these doctrines addresses low-status social identities 
and social signifiers in a different fashion, each has its own political 
and legal history, and each has its own source of Constitutional 
authority. Regardless, the social conception of immutability 
provides a conceptually unified account of these seemingly 
disparate aspects of constitutional antidiscrimination law, which 
suggests that social immutability is less a departure from and more 
an extension of legal and normative principles immanent within 
Equal Protection doctrine. 
A. Animus
Animus has often been glossed as an illicit subjective intent—a 
bare desire to harm118 or a “fit of spite.”119 Yet Akhil Amar and 
Susannah Pollvogt have convincingly shown that the Court’s 
animus jurisprudence is best understood as targeting public laws 
that irrationally disadvantage particular groups based on their 
social status, regardless of the subjective intent behind such laws.120 
For example, according to Amar, a piece of legislation evinces 
unconstitutional animus when it “singles out a named class of 
persons for status-based disadvantage.”121 This was, Amar argues, 
the constitutionally sound principle underlying Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, a case taking up an amendment 
to the Colorado Constitution which preemptively overruled 
attempts to grant “protected status” to gays, lesbians, and bisexual 
individuals.122 As Amar rightly points out, Kennedy does not argue 
that a hostile intent per se is unconstitutional; rather, Kennedy 
holds that Equal Protection is violated because the Colorado 
118. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that “a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest”). 
119. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 887 (2012).  
121. Amar, supra note 120, at 225. 
122. Id.; Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–25. 
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amendment constituted “a status-based enactment[,] . . . a 
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake.”123 
According to Pollvogt, explicitly singling out a particular group 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the Court to conclude that a 
particular piece of legislation evinces unconstitutional animus.124 
As Pollvogt argues, it is unclear that the anti-miscegenation law at 
issue in Loving v. Virginia explicitly singled out Blacks as a group, 
for the law as written applied equally to Blacks as well as to whites; 
nevertheless, the Court correctly concluded that the law constituted 
an expression of white supremacy.125 Loving suggests, then, that 
explicitly singling out a social group is not a necessary component 
of animus-based legislation. 
Conversely, singling out may not be sufficient for a finding of 
animus. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
the Court states that legislation singling out the mentally disabled 
is not inherently unconstitutional, for such legislation often 
“reflects the real and undeniable differences between the [mentally 
disabled] and others.”126 The problem instead was that the 
Cleburne City Council had failed to demonstrate the existence of a 
rational relationship between the trait of mental disability and the 
zoning ordinance at issue, which suggested to the Court that the 
ordinance in fact rested upon “vague generalizations”127 about and 
“irrational prejudice[s]”128 toward the mentally disabled. 
The unifying principle behind Romer, Cleburne, and other 
animus cases is that unconstitutional animus exists when public 
laws arbitrarily “create and enforce distinctions between social 
groups—that is, groups of persons identified by status rather than 
conduct.”129 As the Court has recognized, while the specific 
motivation for drawing such distinctions may vary, in all such cases 
low-status groups are arbitrarily targeted on the basis of their social 
identities or on the basis of signifiers with which they are 
associated. Animus doctrine and the social conception of 
immutability thus share the same foundational insight, which is 
123. Amar, supra note 120, at 227 (citation omitted).
124. Pollvogt, supra note 120, at 925–26. 
125. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
126. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985).
127. Id. at 465 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). 
128. Id. at 450. 
129. See Pollvogt, supra note 125, at 926. 
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that low-status signifiers associated with subordinated groups are 
often regarded—due to prejudice, stereotyping, unsubstantiated 
fear, and other forms of arbitrary bias—as proxies for morally 
condemnable conduct. Moreover, both animus doctrine and the 
social conception of immutability recognize that the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids legislation that enshrines such biases in law. 
B. Stigma
While Cleburne is typically read as an animus case, Justice 
Marshall observes in his concurring opinion that animus is often 
directed towards stigmatized social groups.130 Though Marshall 
does not draw the connection, animus jurisprudence arguably 
shares much conceptual and sociological overlap with another area 
of Equal Protection, namely, the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
stigma jurisprudence. The Court has acknowledged that a concern 
for stigmatic racial harm is central to the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
Notably, the Court has extended stigma doctrine to reach cases of 
sex discrimination, drawing explicitly upon cases involving racially 
stigmatic harm,132 as well as to sexual orientation discrimination.133 
Most recently, for instance, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy points out 
that legislation banning same sex marriage will result in “children 
suffer[ing] the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser,”134 an echo of the “Doll Test” famously cited in Brown.135 
While the Court has not always been clear as to what constitutes 
a legislative imposition of stigma, the general thrust of the doctrine 
is clear: a law imposes stigma when it demeans, degrades, or 
otherwise marks as possessing inherently low-status a particular 
social identity.136 Thus, both stigma jurisprudence and the social 
130. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
131. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 408–10 (1991) (noting that stigmatic harm arising 
from racial discrimination “reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
132. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
134. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 n.11 (1954). 
136. The locus classicus for work on stigma is, of course, ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (Simon & Schuster 2009) (1963) (defining 
stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”). But legal scholars differ over how to 
apply Goffman’s insights to legal doctrine. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (describing stigma as a type of 
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conception of immutability recognize that dominant groups will 
seek to maintain their position in the status hierarchy by marking 
certain social identities as inherently inferior. Yet, as the Court has 
long recognized, the existence of an underclass of stigmatized 
social identities is incompatible with the egalitarian promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Overall, this suggests that the Court’s 
stigma jurisprudence and the social conception of immutability 
draw upon the same empirical and normative framework. 
C. The Badges of Slavery
The social conception of immutability also has a foot planted in 
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. While there is a long history 
of understanding Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment as 
granting Congress the power to abolish the “badges of slavery” in 
the United States,137 only recently has the meaning of this phrase 
been brought to light. According to George Rutherglen, for 
example, a “badge of slavery” generally referred to the fact that 
“[f]rom certain external features, an individual’s social position 
could be inferred.”138 Within the American antislavery movement, 
“badge of slavery” was used more specifically to refer to the fact 
that Black skin color was publicly and widely associated with 
subordinate political status.139 After the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, this phrase was transformed into a term of 
art referring more narrowly to postbellum legal restrictions placed 
upon Black citizens.140 
“psychological injury”); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 249–74 
(1983) (describing stigma as arising from a “breakdown of empathy,” causing low-status 
individuals to be “set apart and treated as not quite fully human”); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 
351 (1987) (arguing that “[t]he injury of stigmatization consists of forcing the injured 
individual to wear a badge or symbol that degrades him in the eyes of society”);  
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
803, 891 (2004) (focusing specifically on “the negative citizenship effects of racial stigma”). 
137. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). 
138. See George A. Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of 
Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 163, 166 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 
2010). 
139. Id.at 165. 
140. Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 561, 575 (2012) (asserting that the phrases’s “meaning appeared to evolve from the 
antebellum to postbellum eras, particularly as it migrated from colloquial to legal use”). 
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The social conception of immutability and the “badges of 
slavery” understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment presuppose 
that status hierarchies operate by associating certain social groups 
with observable and widely understood low-status signifiers. 
Consider, for example, that nineteenth century usages of the phrase 
“badges of slavery” referred to observable signifiers, such as skin 
color or hair texture, commonly associated with different racial 
groups, as well as to postbellum laws targeting Blacks.141 The 
badges metaphor thus referred to an observable property or 
relation (in this case, a legal relation) used to sort individuals into 
racial groups and to convey information about the relative status of 
these groups. 
On my account, then, while the social conception of 
immutability falls under a Fourteenth Amendment heading, it is 
nevertheless closely related to the “badges of slavery” component 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. This is a welcome result given that 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are both based on a 
principle of Equal Protection.142 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for 
example, enacted shortly after the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, promised to all the “full and equal benefit of all 
laws.”143 Doubts about the constitutionality of the Act under the
Thirteenth Amendment led to the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which, by affording to all citizens “the equal 
protection of the laws,” incorporated and expanded upon the Equal 
Protection principles contained within the 1866 Act.144 
141. As Senator Lyman Trumbull argued in defense of the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, “any statute which is not equal to all . . . is, in fact, a badge of servitude 
which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.” See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
142. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200 
(1951) (demonstrating that “[a]t the very foundation of the system constructed out of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Bills is an idea of ‘equal 
protection’”); see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (1986) (noting that “Republicans believed that the 
Thirteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott so that Blacks were entitled to all 
rights of citizens”). 
143. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (1968)). 
144. See CURTIS, supra note 142, at 103 (noting that, while most Republicans denied that 
the Act and the 14th Amendment were identical, “[i]t is clear that the amendment 
incorporated the principles of the bill”). 
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Given their historical backgrounds and shared normative 
principle, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are best 
read in conjunction.145 And this is just what the social conception of 
immutability implies. The social conception of immutability joins 
the normative principle of Equal Protection with a generalized 
account of status hierarchies and social signification. Thus, though 
it is intended primarily as a Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, 
social immutability draws constitutional authority from the
Thirteenth Amendment as well. At the same time, it helps to 
explain the close connection between the two amendments. 
D. Conclusion
My aim in this Part was to show that the insights and principles 
underlying social immutability appear in roughly similar form 
throughout constitutional antidiscrimination law. No doubt my 
analysis has glossed over many significant differences between the 
cases and doctrines surveyed above. Offhand, animus doctrine 
seems best suited for merely occasional instances of legislative bias, 
as in Moreno, and for legislation that arbitrarily targets groups of 
individuals who evince genuine differences, as in Cleburne. Stigma 
doctrine seems better suited for legislative attempts to more 
permanently affix a low status to particular social identities, as was 
the case in Obergefell. Finally, a badges of slavery analysis may be 
particularly relevant for addressing public and private practices 
that subordinate individuals on the basis of race. But the 
important point is that some of the main insights of the social 
conception of immutability are already present within existing 
Equal Protection doctrine. 
IV. APPLICATIONS
In this Part, I show how the social conception of immutability 
can guide Equal Protection doctrine moving forward. The 
argument here is that by adopting a principled agnosticism with 
regard to the underlying nature of protected signifiers, the social 
145. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 n.180 (1992) (arguing that “doctrinal rules implementing the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s basic principles must be sensitively crafted in light of Thirteenth 
Amendment principles” and that “[n]either Amendment ‘trumps’ the other; rather they 
must be synthesized into a coherent doctrinal whole”). 
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conception of immutability extends antidiscrimination protection 
to signifiers associated with gender identity, culture, and ethnicity. 
A. Gender Identity and Expression
Over the last two decades, Equal Protection principles have 
expanded to include gays and lesbians within the scope of those 
protected under antidiscrimination law. The same cannot be said, 
however, for transgender individuals, despite the fact that 
transgender individuals face widespread public and private 
discrimination.146 Seeking to build on the legal victories won by 
gays and lesbians, some transgender activists have argued that 
gender identity satisfies the contemporary immutability 
criterion.147 Other transgender advocates worry, however, that the 
immutability argument will fail to advance transgender rights, for 
it may be the case that some identities or practices that fall under 
the transgender heading reflect individual choice.148 But 
acknowledging that at least some aspects of transgender identity or 
expression are (to some extent) a matter of choice risks 
undermining the immutability argument, both in the courtroom 
and in the public sphere. 
Social immutability opens up a promising source of legal 
protection for transgender individuals. Social immutability depicts 
transgender discrimination as a form of caste-preserving, social 
boundary enforcement. Transgender individuals—particularly 
those who are publicly visible as such—threaten to undermine the 
traditionally rigid distinction between masculine and feminine 
146. See generally JAIME M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET & JUSTIN TANIS, NAT’L GAY & 
LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011); Kevin M. Barry, 
Brian Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi & Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 526–40 (2016) (providing an overview of 
Congressional exclusions of transgender individuals from various antidiscrimination laws). 
147. Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 16 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (noting that “the litigation strategies of 
transgender rights advocates are very much informed by the legacies of the civil rights 
movement . . . especially in the emphasis on immutability”). 
148. Heidi M. Levitt & Maria R. Ippolito, Being Transgender: The Experience of 
Transgender Identity Development, 61 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1727, 1754 (2014) (a study of 
transgender identity development concluding that transgender identity and expression may 
reflect “highly individualized choices in relation to available resources as well as the benefits 
and dangers . . . within social contexts at hand”); see also Currah, supra note 147, at 18 (noting 
the potential of “construct[ing] gender as a choice in legal arguments”). 
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gender signifiers. It is for this reason that gender boundary 
enforcement measures often focus on gender presentation in public 
spaces. For instance, a number of nineteenth century laws made it 
a crime for an individual to appear in public in “dress not belonging 
to his or her sex.”149 Though no longer formally regulated to this 
extent, gender boundaries are often informally enforced in public 
spaces, particularly through verbal harassment or physical violence 
directed towards individuals who are perceived as deviating from 
the traditional sex-gender system.150 
According to the social conception of immutability, whether 
individual choice is involved in any aspect of sex or gender is 
irrelevant. In fact, social immutability does not purport to explain 
how or why an individual comes to personally identify one way or 
another. The social conception of immutability instead attempts to 
identify and explain cases in which individuals are generally 
prevented from crossing social boundaries, where those crossings 
threaten existing social hierarchies.151 The relevant inquiries thus 
concern, first, whether an individual is arbitrarily discriminated 
against on the basis of a signifier that is associated with a low-status 
149. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 27 (1999). 
150. See generally Ki Namaste, Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and the Regulation of 
Public Space, 14 ENV’T & PLAN. D 221, 221 (1996) (discussing evidence of public assaults 
motivated by “perceived transgression of normative sex-gender relations”). One 
complication worth noting here is that gender boundaries are asymmetrically enforced, in 
that transgender women seem to face far more hostility than transgender men. One plausible 
explanation for this asymmetry is that, for many cisgender heterosexual men, homophobia 
is used to police the boundaries of masculinity, such that any same-sex sexual contact throws 
into serious doubt one’s masculine identity. Cisgender heterosexual men thus may fear that 
they will be “tricked” into forming intimate relationships with opposite gender but same-
sex individuals. Sexual deception is often cited, for example, as the motivating factor behind 
the murder of transgender women by cisgender heterosexual men. The infliction of brutal 
violence upon transgender women, who are cast as “effeminate” and therefore deviant men, 
serves as a means by which to reaffirm one’s masculinity. By contrast, this logic does not 
obtain for cisgender heterosexual women, for it is the infliction of violence, and not same-
sex sexual contact, that is destabilizing to conventional feminine identity.  
See generally Kristen Schilt & Laurel Westbrook, Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity:  
“Gender Normals,” Transgender People, and the Social Maintenance of Heterosexuality, 23 GENDER 
& SOC’Y 440 (2009). 
151. For the sake of space, I must elide a more detailed analysis of hierarchy and social 
boundaries accounting for the more specific differences between various social boundaries. 
For example, transgender women, who move from a dominant to a subordinate status group, 
seem to face more persecution than transgender men, but this is not true for whites who 
attempt to pass as Black and tend to face derision but not persecution. Blacks who pass as 
whites, however, face both. 
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social identity and, second, whether those who are taken to bear the 
signifier generally face discriminatory treatment in various social 
and political domains. 
Of course, one might argue that transgender discrimination 
does not quite fit this mold. An individual who, say, transitions 
from presenting as a woman to presenting as a man may face 
discrimination not because he bears male signifiers per se but 
simply because he bears gender signifiers that do not match his 
assigned sex at birth. But here it is important to recall why the social 
conception of immutability focuses on signifiers in the first place. 
Clearly demarcated signifiers of masculinity and femininity are 
required in order to maintain a gender hierarchy. According to the 
social conception of immutability, however, Equal Protection 
forbids arbitrary discrimination that reinforces unjust status 
hierarchies, and this remains so regardless of the signifiers borne 
by victims of discriminatory treatment. 
The argument that social immutability extends to transgender 
identity is further bolstered by recent developments in asylum law. 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1956, an individual 
is eligible for asylum if they are unwilling to return to their country 
of origin due to a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion.”152 The Act leaves undefined, however, what 
constitutes membership in a “particular social group.” The Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first defined “particular social 
group” as “a group of persons all of whom share a common, 
immutable characteristic.”153 While courts have not settled on a 
uniform definition of “immutable characteristic” in the asylum 
context, a few recent cases have come strikingly close to adopting 
something like social immutability. 
In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, for instance, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the BIA’s denial of asylum to Geovanni Hernandez-
Montiel, a gay, transgender asylum seeker who testified to being 
raped by Mexican police and “attacked with a knife by a group of 
young men who called him names relating to his sexual 
orientation.”154 An immigration judge denied Hernandez-Montiel’s 
152. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
153. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
154. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000).
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request for asylum, arguing that because Hernandez-Montiel 
“wears typical female clothing sometimes, and typical male 
clothing other times, he cannot characterize his assumed female 
persona as immutable or fundamental to his identity.”155 Upon 
review, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning. The 
Ninth Circuit identified Hernandez-Montiel as belonging to a class 
of “gay men with female sexual identities.”156 These men, the court 
wrote, face persecution because they “outwardly manifest their 
identities through characteristics traditionally associated with 
women, such as feminine dress, long hair[,] and fingernails.”157 In 
other words, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, gender signifiers, though 
mutable, may nonetheless constitute fundamental parts of an 
individual’s personal identity.158 
Of course, the Hernandez-Montiel decision still relies on the 
“personal identity” conception of immutability I rejected above.159 
However, other circuit courts have begun to recognize, at least in 
asylum cases, that individuals are often targeted for persecution on 
the basis of an ascriptive social identity. The Second Circuit, for 
example, has defined “particular social group” as a group 
“comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental 
characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the 
eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in 
general.”160 Similarly, the Third Circuit has developed a doctrine of 
“imputed membership in a social group” that explicitly includes 
individuals who do not personally identify as homosexual but 
who are socially identified as homosexual and persecuted on 
these grounds.161 As one scholar has argued, transgender 
individuals may be able to bring a claim under an “imputed 
identity” standard.162 
These recent developments in asylum law find direct support 
from the social conception of immutability. Descriptively, the social 
155. Id. at 1089 (internal citation omitted).
156. Id. at 1094. 
157. Id. 
158. See also Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. See supra Section I.C. 
160. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
161. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3rd Cir. 2003).
162. See Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”: Recent 
Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB.  
L.J. 237 (2005). 
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conception of immutability explains how mutable signifiers may be 
fundamental to an ascribed, low-status social identity. 
Normatively, the social conception of immutability extends legal 
protection to individuals who face discrimination on the basis of 
their imputed (which is to say, ascribed) identity. The Second 
Circuit’s claim that certain social groups face persecution because 
they share a “fundamental characteristic . . . in the eyes of the 
outside world” nicely captures both the empirical and normative 
dimensions of social immutability.163 And from the other direction, 
litigators and scholars of asylum law have argued that these asylum 
cases should inform Equal Protection.164 The social conception of 
immutability provides a unified account of why antidiscrimination 
law must extend to transgender individuals both in asylum law and 
in constitutional Equal Protection law. 
B. Hair
Social immutability also extends Equal Protection to signifiers 
associated with particular racial groups, regardless of whether the 
adoption and display of these signifiers is the result of individual 
choice. This constitutes a departure from current doctrine, 
according to which signifiers resulting from accidents of birth 
denote race, which is protected under antidiscrimination law, while 
signifiers resulting from individual choice denote ethnicity or 
culture, which is not. This distinction, however, is implausible. 
For example, in a number of cases Black employees have 
challenged corporate grooming policies forbidding hairstyles, such 
as cornrows or dreadlocks, commonly associated with Black 
individuals. Plaintiffs typically claim that these policies place 
undue burdens on individuals for adopting cultural practices 
associated with their racial group.165 Renee Rogers, for instance, 
163. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664. 
164. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender 
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 404–05 
(2001) (arguing that Hernandez-Montiel “promises to provide a useful mode of analysis in a 
wide range of sex- and sexual orientation-based claims, including those concerning . . . 
violations of equal protection”); see also Landau, supra note 162; Anthony R. Enriquez, 
Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: The Right to Choose “Immutable” Identity 
Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373 (2013). 
165. For an incisive overview of hair discrimination caselaw, see Paulette M. Caldwell, 
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. See also 
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challenged American Airlines’ policy forbidding cornrows on the 
grounds that cornrows are “reflective of cultural, historical essence 
of the Black women in American society.”166 Similarly, Charles 
Eatman, challenging a United Parcel Service policy forbidding 
uncovered dreadlocks, claimed that his hair was an important 
connection to “African identity and heritage.”167 Though 
acknowledging that their hairstyles were in part due to choice, both 
plaintiffs argued that burdening an individual on the basis of a 
cultural signifier associated with race is effectively a form of 
race-based discrimination. 
Hair discrimination cases are generally resolved in favor of the 
employer, and most of these cases follow a similar dialectic. 
Defendant employer offers (what courts take to be) a legitimate 
business rationale for their grooming policy, such as the need to 
present a conventional, professional image. Courts tend to argue 
that the forbidden hairstyles are commonly but not exclusively 
adopted by or associated with Black individuals; hence, policies 
forbidding these hairstyles are formally race neutral. And while 
acknowledging that the hair of many Black individuals is 
particularly well-suited for locked hairstyles, courts often assert 
that, because adopting a particular hairstyle is a matter of 
individual choice, hairstyles reflect culture, not race, and so are not 
eligible for protection under antidiscrimination law.168 
As a number of scholars have pointed out, these arguments do 
not take into account the history of using hair texture to classify and 
subordinate Black individuals. For example, Thomas Jefferson, in 
his Notes on the State of Virginia, claimed that Blacks could never be 
incorporated into the state due to their supposed “physical and 
moral” differences, among which he included the absence of 
“flowing hair.”169 Indeed, hair type, to a greater extent than skin 
color, was often determinative of racial categorization.170 In the 
1806 decision Hudgins v. Wrights, for instance, the Supreme Court 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title 
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010). 
166. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
167. Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
168. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
169. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 145 (Frank Shuffelton ed., 
Penguin Books 1999) (1785). 
170. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 60–62 
(1st ed. 1982). 
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of Virginia asserted that a “woolly head of hair” was the 
predominant “ingredient in the African constitution.”171 
In light of this history, the judicial reasoning evident in hair 
discrimination cases seems especially implausible. In Eatman, for 
instance, Blacks constituted ninety-four percent of the employees 
affected by UPS’s grooming policies.172 Various UPS managers 
“told [Eatman] that he looked like an alien and like Stevie Wonder, 
twice compared his hair to ‘shit,’ linked his hair to ‘extracurricular’ 
drug use, requested a pair of scissors (as if to cut off the locks), and 
pulled his hair.”173 Nevertheless, the court held that these 
comments were not racially discriminatory because they did not, in 
the court’s view, mention Eatman’s race.174 
To be sure, one might argue that courts have not overlooked 
this history but are simply working within the constraints of 
current Equal Protection doctrine, according to which mutable 
characteristics are not protected. Curiously, however, courts have 
repeatedly reaffirmed the holding of Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual 
Hospital Insurance, according to which corporate grooming policies 
forbidding “Afro” hairstyles could be considered racially 
discriminatory.175 In this case, Beverly Jeanne Jenkins was denied a 
promotion on the grounds that “[she] could never represent Blue 
Cross with [her] Afro.”176 According to the majority opinion, “[a] 
layperson[’]s description of racial discrimination could hardly be 
more explicit. The reference to the Afro hairstyle was merely the 
method by which the plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly expressed 
the employer’s racial discrimination.”177 
This is a puzzling result, given that one could offer the same 
arguments in defense of corporate grooming policies forbidding 
Afro hairstyles. After all, not all individuals racialized as Black 
grow hair suitable for an Afro hairstyle, whereas some non-Black 
individuals do. Moreover, growing and maintaining an Afro is to 
some extent due to individual choice, given that an individual 
could simply keep their hair closely cropped or shaved entirely. 
171. Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806).
172. Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 168. 
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Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly (and, in my view, correctly) 
observed that policies forbidding Afro hairstyles support an 
inference of racial discrimination, on the grounds that Afros are 
immutable whereas locked hairstyles are not. 
Why do courts seem to understand the connotations of an “Afro 
ban” but not the connotations of a ban on locked hair styles? On my 
reading, the real crux of the hair discrimination cases lies in the fact 
that since at least the mid-1960s the Afro has been commonly 
associated with a more self-consciously confrontational style of 
Black political activism.178 Indeed, the association of the Afro with 
militant Black political movements is widely accepted among 
scholars of the subject.179 Consider that Jenkins was decided in 1976; 
in this cultural moment, it would have been difficult to ignore the 
connotations of a workplace policy forbidding Afros. By contrast, 
locked hairstyles do not seem to have acquired the same 
widespread political valence, at least among a (generally white) 
judiciary. This partly explains why courts perceive the social 
connotations of an Afro ban as opposed to the social connotations 
of a ban on locked hairstyles. 
Ultimately the logic in hair discrimination cases falters because 
no hairstyle is immutable, strictly speaking. As Kobena Mercer 
observes, all hairstyles rely on “artificial techniques to attain their 
characteristic shapes and hence political significance.”180 Courts 
should thus abandon the traditional immutability analysis and 
consider directly the political significance of corporate 
grooming policies. 
It is important to be cautious here, however, since much 
scholarship critical of hair discrimination urges courts to expand 
antidiscrimination law to protect an individual’s self-conceived 
ethnic, cultural, or racial identity. Camille Gear Rich, for example, 
argues that plaintiffs like Charles Eatman are engaged in acts of 
“race/ethnicity performance,” which she defines as “any behavior 
or voluntarily displayed attribute which, by accident or design, 
178. Robin D. G. Kelley, Nap Time: Historicizing the Afro, 1 FASHION THEORY 339, 339 
(1997) (noting that “the Afro has clearly been the most powerful symbol of Black Power 
style politics”). 
179. Id. at 340 (observing that “the Afro’s long-standing association with post-1966 
Black militancy has become ‘common sense’ in the world of hair scholarship”). 
180. Kobena Mercer, Black Hair/Style Politics, in OUT THERE: MARGINALIZATION AND 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 247, 256 (Russell Ferguson et al. eds., 1990). 
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communicates racial or ethnic identity or status.”181 According to 
Rich, the current conception of immutability “devalues the 
psychological and dignitary interests that employees have in 
race/ethnicity performance.”182 
While sympathetic to such proposals, I believe that they face 
two decisive objections. First, it is unnecessary for courts to 
consider whether an individual is adopting or performing a 
particular identity. This objection is similar to the objection raised 
above against the personal identity conception of immutability: just 
as a gay individual might not believe that their sexual orientation 
is fundamental to their personal identity, it is likely that at least 
some Black individuals adopt a locked hairstyle not because it is 
essential to their ethnic, cultural or racial identity but out of, say, 
aesthetic preference or simple convenience. Yet racial and cultural 
identity models would deny protection to such individuals.183 This 
outcome is implausible. Suppose that a Black individual “passing” 
as white were “exposed” and then subjected to humiliating 
treatment at work. Surely antidiscrimination law should afford this 
individual relief, even though they had clearly refused to perform 
their racial identity. As the social conception of immutability makes 
clear, antidiscrimination law must protect individuals from 
arbitrary discrimination regardless of how they personally relate to 
their stigmatized signifiers. 
Second, ethnic or cultural identity models require that courts 
identify which aspects of a culture are essential to identity. 
However, there are good reasons to be skeptical that courts can or 
even should engage in this sort of inquiry. Cultures, especially in a 
multicultural society, are dynamic and overlapping. It is unclear 
how courts would decide which cultural phenomena belong to 
which groups, especially given that social groups themselves often 
internally disagree over what is essential to their group’s 
181. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and 
the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1139 (2004); see also D. Wendy Greene, Splitting 
Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1035 (2017) (arguing 
that for plaintiffs like Renee Rogers, “hair texture and the ways in which it grows and is 
styled are central to their personhood as Black women”). 
182. Rich, supra note 181, at 1141. 
183. See id. at 1211. 
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identity.184 Even if a consensus were to emerge, a court’s decision 
to ratify certain cultural signifiers as expressive of an authentic 
racial identity will “discredit anyone who does not fit the culture 
style ascribed to her racial group.”185 At least one court has declined 
to protect cultural signifiers for these reasons,186 and it seems 
unlikely that other courts will be more inclined to wade into these 
murky waters, especially given that courts have consistently 
declined to engage in similar inquiries with regard to religious 
beliefs and practices.187 
On the social conception of immutability, signifiers constitutive 
of or closely associated with stigmatized or subordinated social 
identities, whether mutable or immutable, receive protection under 
antidiscrimination law. To be sure, there will likely be cases in 
which it is unclear that a signifier meets these criteria; thus, courts 
must still inquire into how particular social identities are 
constructed. However, with regard to hair discrimination, it is not 
just that hair texture is associated with Black individuals; hair 
texture has also been used historically and legally to construct 
Blackness as a racial category.188 Thus, corporate grooming policies 
and workplace behaviors that implicitly or explicitly demean 
hairstyles associated with Black individuals thereby contribute to 
the stigmatization of Black identity.189 
184. Compare, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 73, at 845 (drawing up a list of attributes 
constitutive of gay culture) with FORD, supra note 11, at 71–72 (criticizing attempts, including 
Yoshino’s, to “define group differences with sufficient formality as to produce a list of  
traits at all”). 
185. Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811 (2000). 
186. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1170–72 (11th Cir. 2016). 
187. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (asserting that it is “not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, 
or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds”); see also United 
States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting an “overriding interest 
in keeping the government . . . out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of 
differing religious claims”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457 
(1988) (asserting that it is not the Court’s role to find “that some sincerely held religious 
beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary 
from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit”). 
188. Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806).
189. To be clear, my analysis is limited to corporate grooming policies that specifically 
target hairstyles commonly associated with Black individuals. I do not address the more 
difficult question of whether all corporate grooming policies that draw distinctions based on 
social identities—such as gender-specific grooming policies—are impermissible. For a 
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It is also important to distinguish my view from a similar view 
defended by Richard Ford. Ford argues that bans on locked 
hairstyles violate Title VII only when such bans are used by 
employers as proxies for racial identity.190 Thus, he claims, if Renee 
Rogers were able to demonstrate that American Airlines banned 
cornrows in order to screen out Black women from the applicant 
pool, then Rogers’ claim should be sustained. However, on Ford’s 
view the same would be true if Rogers was able to demonstrate that 
American Airlines banned, say, hoop earrings in order to screen out 
Black women from the applicant pool, even if hoop earrings are not 
generally associated with Black social identity. In both cases, Ford 
argues, the grooming policy might constitute evidence of a 
discriminatory intent, but the existence of a discriminatory intent 
still must be proved in court.191 In the absence of an intent to 
discriminate, he concludes, neither policy is objectionable.192 
Though the conception of immutability that I have been 
defending similarly forbids discrimination by proxy, the 
differences between Ford’s view and mine are significant. Ford 
introduces the notion of discrimination by proxy because, in his 
view, bans on locked hairstyles do not themselves constitute 
disparate treatment nor do they constitute wrongful disparate 
impact. According to Ford, if a ban on mutable traits or behaviors 
is to constitute disparate treatment, it must be shown that these 
traits or behaviors are essential to a particular group’s identity, 
“such that a workplace rule prohibiting the behavior or trait would 
be illicit discrimination per se, just as a rule requiring that all 
employees have fair skin would be racial discrimination per se.”193 
Ford is highly skeptical, however, of claims that certain mutable 
traits or behaviors are essential to racial group identity.194 
Moreover, Ford argues, bans on locked hairstyles do not 
constitute disparate impact, because such bans “do not deprive 
critical discussion of this broader question, see ROBERT C. POST, K. ANTHONY APPIAH, JUDITH 
BUTLER, THOMAS C. GREY & REVA B. SIEGEL, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF 
AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001). 
190. See FORD, supra note 11, at 199. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 198. 
193. Id. at 180. 
194. Id. at 97–99. 
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anyone of job opportunities.”195 Rather, Ford claims, such bans 
merely disfavor employees who prefer “unconventional 
hairstyles.”196 According to Ford, when faced with a ban on locked 
hairstyles, “[p]resumably some will change their hairstyle in order 
to get or keep the job.”197 
While Ford is rightfully skeptical of claims that locked 
hairstyles are essential to Black cultural identity, he fails to consider 
that mutable signifiers can become part of a group’s social identity. 
To see this point, consider Ford’s observation that, while a 
grooming policy banning locked hairstyles might constitute 
evidence of a discriminatory intent, a grooming policy banning or 
disfavoring dark skin constitutes discrimination per se. Why would 
this latter policy constitute discrimination per se? Ford’s approach 
suggests that this policy is racially discriminatory per se because it 
constitutes irrefutable evidence of a racially discriminatory intent.198 
However, this might not be true in all cases. Suppose, for example, 
that the employer is a newly arrived foreigner who is totally 
unfamiliar with the American racial caste system. For this 
employer, hiring employees with lighter skin, regardless of their 
racial categorization, is important for projecting a conventional, 
business-like image. Though this policy will disadvantage potential 
employees who prefer not to engage in skin lightening treatments, 
presumably some will change their skin tone in order to get or 
keep the job. 
Despite the absence of a racially discriminatory intent, this 
policy would plainly constitute discrimination per se. What makes 
the act discriminatory per se is not the intent, or lack thereof, but 
the fact that the act targets a signifier that is constitutive of a low-
status social identity. That is, even if an employer were entirely 
unaware of the relationship between dark skin and American racial 
categories, a policy disfavoring dark skin would inherently 
stigmatize Black social identity because dark skin is partly 
195. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
196. Id. at 139. 
197. Id. at 199. 
198. Id. at 180 (arguing that per se arguments, “if accepted . . . would make the claim of 
discrimination irrefutable”). 
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constitutive of Black social identity.199 This holds true even if some 
individuals would change their skin tone in order to get or keep the 
job, for the expressive meaning of the policy—that dark skin is 
unconventional and unprofessional—plainly stigmatizes Black 
social identity, regardless of the employer’s intent. 
But once this point is acknowledged the inquiry turns to 
determining which signifiers are constitutive of the relevant social 
identity. Given that, as we saw above, hair texture and hairstyle 
have long been used to construct Blackness as a racial category, it 
is hardly plausible to argue that policies disfavoring hairstyles 
associated with Black individuals merely disfavor unconventional 
and mutable cultural preferences. To be sure, my account takes on 
board Ford’s insight regarding discrimination by proxy: intent is 
relevant in cases where employers adopt idiosyncratic policies in 
order to screen out protected social groups. My account differs 
from Ford’s, however, in two important respects: first, in my view, 
discrimination per se is not simply a matter of intent: it is also a 
matter of the objective social meaning of policies that disfavor 
signifiers constitutive of or closely associated with protected social 
groups; second, because mutable signifiers can be used to define 
particular social groups, policies that disfavor these signifiers 
constitute discrimination per se. Thus, the social conception of 
immutability provides support for the claim that workplace 
grooming policies targeting hairstyles adopted by or associated 
with Black individuals are discriminatory per se. 
C. Language
In a number of cases, courts have held that the possession of a 
foreign accent and the ability to speak multiple languages are 
protected characteristics under antidiscrimination law, on the 
grounds that patterns of speech often denote racial or ethnic 
background. Yet language discrimination cases, like hair 
discrimination cases, often follow a tortuous logic. In language 
discrimination cases, courts have struggled to distinguish between 
199. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 111 
(3d ed. 2014) (describing the role of “[p]erceived differences in skin color” in the “definition 
and understanding of racial categories”); see also Lionel K. McPherson, Black American Social 
Identity and Its Blackness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 369, 376 
(Naomi Zack ed., 2016) (describing Black American social identity as arising from 
“paradigmatic social dynamics [that] track visible African ancestry”). 
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the immutable and mutable characteristics of language; to identify 
the connections between language, ethnicity, and personal identity; 
and to separate out legitimate language regulation from mere 
arbitrary bias. As I shall argue in this Section, the results have been 
scattershot and unconvincing. 
The Supreme Court recognized nearly one century ago that 
language can be used to identify and subordinate ethnic or cultural 
outsiders. In the 1923 case Nebraska v. Meyer, the Court subtly 
addressed the post-World War I, anti-German bias underlying the 
state’s restrictions on foreign language instruction. In the Court’s 
view, the desire to form a linguistically homogenous polity is 
understandable, given the “[u]nfortunate experiences during the 
late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent 
adversaries.”200 However, the Court concluded, the chosen means 
are impermissible because “[t]he protection of the Constitution 
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to 
those born with English on the tongue.”201 These aspects of the case 
suggest that Meyer, though most often read as a touchstone for 
substantive due process rights,202 can plausibly also be read as an 
early animus case, wherein language is targeted as a proxy for 
national origin. 
This reading of Meyer gains plausibility from another language 
discrimination case close in time. In the 1926 case Yu Cong Eng v. 
Trinidad, the Court invalidated Act No. 2972 of the Philippine 
Legislature—the so-called Chinese Bookkeeping Act.203 The Act 
made it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in 
commercial activity in the Philippine Islands “to keep its account 
books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local 
dialect.”204 The claimed purpose of the Act was to facilitate the 
accurate tally and collection of a general sales tax. While the vast 
majority of the 12,000 Chinese merchants to whom the tax applied 
could neither read nor write in any of the local languages, violators 
of the Act could be fined up to $5,000 and could be imprisoned for 
up to two years.205 
200. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
201. Id. at 401. 
202. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1509 (1999). 
203. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 524–25 (1926). 
204. Id. at 508. 
205. Id. at 513–14, 518. 
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The Court, citing Meyer, framed its holding in terms of 
due process: in the Court’s view, the Act constituted an “oppressive 
and arbitrary” infringement upon the liberty of the affected 
Chinese merchants.206 However, just as in Meyer, there was a clear 
Equal Protection issue at stake, which came out in the Court’s 
analysis of the Act itself. Rejecting a number of alternate 
constructions, some of which may have preserved the 
constitutionality of the Act, the Court asserted that there was no 
“doubt that the Act . . . was chiefly directed against the Chinese 
merchants” and that the Act was “obviously intended chiefly to 
affect [Chinese merchants] as distinguished from the rest of the 
community.”207 On these grounds the Court declared the Act a 
violation of Equal Protection. 
In light of Meyer and Yu Cong Eng, there is ample precedent for 
including language discrimination within antidiscrimination law, 
and contemporary courts accept that speakers of foreign languages 
deserve protection. Yet there is considerable disagreement over the 
grounds for providing such protection. As one court noted recently, 
“[t]hat minority language groups are vulnerable to majoritarian 
politics is clear . . . [but] what is not yet clear is how best to 
protect them.”208 
Some courts have applied a conventional immutability 
analysis. In Garcia v. Gloor, for instance, the Fifth Circuit considered 
a Title VII challenge to an employer’s rule prohibiting bilingual 
employees engaged in sales work from speaking Spanish on the 
job.209 Finding in favor of the employer, the Court noted that “[t]o 
a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has 
difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home, 
language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, 
sex or place of birth.”210 Yet the workplace regulation in question 
applied only to bilingual employees, and, according to the Court, 
“the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a 
particular time is by definition a matter of choice.”211 Thus, in the 
206. Id. at 525. 
207. Id. at 514, 528. 
208. Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 305 (D.P.R. 1992) (citation omitted). 
209. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
210. Id. at 270. 
211. Id. 
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Court’s view the employer’s policy did not discriminate on the 
basis of a protected characteristic.212 
In other cases, courts have focused on the significance that 
language often has for an individual’s personal identity. In 
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, for instance, the Ninth Circuit 
considered a challenge to a municipal court policy forbidding 
employees from speaking any language other than English, except 
when acting as translators or during breaks or lunchtime.213 
Holding that “English-only rules generally have an adverse impact 
on protected groups and . . . should be closely scrutinized,” the 
court argued that an individual’s primary language “remains an 
important link to . . . ethnic culture and identity.”214 The Gutierrez 
opinion, and others like it, invoke language familiar from the 
personal identity conception of immutability I discussed above.215 
Other courts, however, have avoided the immutability 
question, reasoning instead that language is often a proxy for, if not 
partly constitutive of, race or national origin. In Hernandez v. New 
York, for example, the Supreme Court reviewed a New York state 
prosecutor’s decision to exercise peremptory challenges to exclude 
Spanish-speaking individuals from serving as jurors for a trial in 
which Spanish language testimony would be central.216 Three of the 
four excluded individuals were Hispanic; yet, the prosecutor 
denied that he sought to exclude Hispanic individuals, maintaining 
instead that he wished to exclude only individuals who “might 
have difficulty in accepting the translator’s rendition of Spanish-
language testimony,” a category that extended to Hispanics and 
non-Hispanics alike.217 
While deeming the prosecutor’s reasoning race-neutral, the 
plurality opinions split over how to conceive of the connection 
between language and race or national origin. Citing Meyer and Yu 
Cong Eng, Justice Kennedy observed that “for certain ethnic groups 
and in some communities . . . proficiency in a particular language, 
212. Id. at 272. 
213. Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
214. Id. at 1039–40; see also Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 309 (D.P.R. 1992) 
(holding that “[t]he use of one’s language is an important aspect of one’s ethnicity, and 
should not be sacrificed to government or business interests without good cause”). 
215. See supra Section I.C. 
216. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
217. Id. at 361. 
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like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an 
[E]qual [P]rotection analysis.”218 By contrast, according to Justice
O’Connor, “[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated
to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike
does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on
race.”219 For Justice O’Connor, a language-based peremptory
challenge would violate Equal Protection only if it served as a
pretext for racial discrimination.
Despite these differences, in most language cases the practical 
upshot is the same: regardless of how they conceive of language 
and the relationship between language and race or national origin, 
courts tend to carefully scrutinize language-based regulations. 
Since, in my view, this is as it should be, it may seem pedantic 
to insist upon a clearer understanding of language for 
antidiscrimination law. However, the persistence of such varied 
and conflicting rationales is indicative of deeper flaws in 
the doctrine. 
First, attempts to distinguish between the immutable and 
mutable aspects of language have led to implausible results. For 
example, while the Garcia court argued that monolinguism is 
immutable, this characteristic can be changed; for some 
individuals, the change may be relatively easy.220 Second, though 
there is no doubt that language can constitute a central part of an 
individual’s ethnic identity, this is not true in every case. An 
individual may decide to speak in their native tongue merely for 
convenience, while a native English speaker who adopts a second 
language may not identify as a member of the associated ethnic 
group. Yet, if language ought to receive some form of protection 
under antidiscrimination law, presumably such individuals ought 
to receive protection. An employer who discriminates on the basis 
of ethnicity should not be shielded from legal repercussions merely 
because the victim does not identify with the relevant ethnic group. 
Finally, while it may be unclear whether language is 
constitutive of race or ethnicity, Justice O’Connor’s suggestion—
that no matter how closely language serves as a proxy for race, 
language discrimination is not race discrimination—is untenable. 
218. Id. at 371. 
219. Id. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
220. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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As the Court properly recognized in Meyer and Yu Cong Eng, 
language discrimination is often a form of racial or ethnic 
discrimination. At the same time, however, it is plausible that some 
workplace regulations restricting language choice reflect legitimate 
business needs and that, when properly tailored, such regulations 
neither express nor cater to racial or ethnic hostility. For instance, a 
business might reasonably require that, when carrying out business 
transactions, employees communicate in the language of the 
business’s customers. The same cannot be said, however, for 
workplace regulations that cater to customers who prefer to be 
served only by same-race employees. 
On my view, there is no need to shoehorn language into the 
traditional immutability framework. What is needed for 
antidiscrimination law is not an account of what language is but an 
account of how language functions within status hierarchies. On 
the social conception of immutability, language is of particular 
interest as a social signifier because a spoken language, like hair 
texture, skin color, and gender expression, is an easily observable 
property that is often used by dominant groups to categorize and 
subordinate minority groups. While Justice Kennedy is exactly 
right to claim that language, in some cases, is akin to race or 
ethnicity, this is not because of any intrinsic features of language 
itself. It is instead because language, like skin color, is often used to 
sort individuals into distinct social groups. The social conception 
of immutability thus requires that language restrictions be 
carefully scrutinized. 
To some extent courts have already adopted this view. 
For example, in Pemberthy v. Beyer, another case dealing with the 
exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors, the Third Circuit argued that 
“[b]ecause language-speaking ability is so closely correlated with 
ethnicity, a trial court must carefully assess the challenger’s actual 
motivation even where the challenger asserts a rational reason to 
discriminate based on language skills.”221 For the Pemberthy court, 
“[t]he dispositive question is the factual question of subjective 
intent.”222 For some scholars, the Pemberthy holding, though 
imperfect, is sufficiently protective of linguistic minorities. 
According to Andrew P. Averbach, for instance, “[a]lthough 
221. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3rd Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
222. Id. 
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language minorities may face a difficult task in demonstrating 
intent,” the holding in Pemberthy “affords them an opportunity to 
challenge some of the most common (and often the most invidious) 
types of language discrimination.”223 
On my view, Pemberthy falls short in two respects. First, as I 
have discussed in this Part, signifiers such as hair, dress, and 
language are not only used as proxies for a particular social 
identity; rather, they may be used to construct the identity itself. 
Thus, there is no reason to require that plaintiffs prove the existence 
of a discriminatory intent in addition to the intent to discriminate 
against signifiers that are constitutive of a particular social identity. 
This would be akin to requiring that plaintiffs prove the existence 
of an intent to discriminate against Blacks in addition to an intent 
to discriminate against Black skin. Second, requiring subordinate 
groups to prove the existence of a discriminatory intent is both 
unfair and bound to underprotect. Linguistic minorities, which are 
often politically and socially isolated, are likely to be at a 
disadvantage with regard to investigating economic and political 
majorities. Moreover, given that, as various courts have recognized, 
language discrimination has a long history in the United States, 
there is more than enough reason to shift the evidentiary burden to 
those who seek to impose language restrictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the social conception of immutability is able to explain 
recent developments within the law and to provide a principled 
basis for deciding future cases in a manner consistent with 
historical Equal Protection principles. The basic insight of the social 
conception of immutability is that immutability analysis should be 
used to prevent dominant groups from constructing or relying 
upon relatively fixed, stigmatized signifiers in order to maintain 
socially impermeable group boundaries. For this purpose, the 
biological or psychological traits, individual choices, and personal 
identities of stigmatized individuals are normatively irrelevant. 
The move away from focusing on individual choice and 
personal identity is also important, given the demographic 
223. Andrew P. Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When 
Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 502 (1994). 
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trajectory of American society. Consider Wendy Greene’s astute 
observation: 
[I]n light of increased immigration, cultural diversity, interracial
marriage, and transracial adoption, as well as the formal
recognition of multi-racial identity and more fluid self-
characterizations of racial, ethnic, religious, and gender identity,
claims stemming from misperceptions about a plaintiff’s
protected status may become as commonplace as traditional
claims of discrimination based upon an individual’s self-classified
identity.224
Current political trends notwithstanding, it does seem likely 
that future generations will increasingly be able to choose among a 
panoply of racial, cultural, ethnic, and gender identities. Yet if 
current immutability doctrine is retained, these choices will 
undercut an important source of protection against discriminatory 
treatment, thereby allowing impermeable group boundaries to 
persist and caste hierarchy to endure. As I hope to have 
demonstrated in this Article, however, the social conception of 
immutability is a promising alternative. 
224. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception 
Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 91 (2013). 
